\u3ci\u3eWindsor\u3c/i\u3e: Lochnerizing on Marriage? by Girgis, Sherif
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 3
2014
Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage?
Sherif Girgis
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sherif Girgis, Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage?, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 971 (2014)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol64/iss3/10
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
971 
Windsor: Lochnerizing on 
Marriage? 
Sherif Girgis† 
Abstract 
This Article defends three insights from Justice Alito’s Windsor 
dissent. First, federalism alone could not justify judicially gutting 
DOMA. As I show, the best contrary argument just equivocates.  
Second, the usual equal protection analysis is inapt for such a 
case. I will show that DOMA was unlike the policies struck down in 
canonical sex-discrimination cases, interracial marriage bans, and 
other policies that involve suspect classifications. Its basic criterion 
was a couple’s sexual composition. And this feature—unlike an 
individual’s sex or a couple’s racial composition—is linked to a social 
goal, where neither link nor goal is just invented or invidious. 
Third, and relatedly, to strike down DOMA on equal protection 
grounds, the Court had to assume the truth of a “consent-based” view 
of the nature of marriage and the social value of recognizing it, or the 
falsity of a “conjugal” view of the same value and policy judgments. 
But as I show, nothing in our constitutional tradition—read as 
broadly as possible, even by non-originalists—deems the first true or 
the second false; both are reasonable; and it is historically impossible 
to ascribe the conjugal view to mere animus.  
I conclude that the equal-protection ruling against DOMA 
Lochnerizes—as would equal-protection rulings against traditional 
state marriage laws—even if we embrace several scholars’ proposals 
for expanding equal protection jurisprudence. So to defend Windsor or 
decisions against traditional state marriage laws, one must justify 
Lochnerizing or distinguish it.  
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Introduction1 
There was something tediously familiar—and unsatisfying—about 
the divide in United States v. Windsor.2 It featured Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s dizzying majority opinion against Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
ardent dissent. For Kennedy, section 3 of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act3 (DOMA) violated equal protection, or due process, or 
federalism—or a combination of these, or a hybrid. For Scalia, 
“downright boring” policy goals could rebut charges of  
nefarious intent.4  
For Kennedy, Windsor involved a collision of worldviews,5 and 
the fault lay with DOMA for having imposed on same-sex spouses “a 
 
1. I thank Akhil Reed Amar, Kenji Yoshino, Andrew Koppelman, Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, and Robert P. George for helpful comments and 
discussions.  
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated in part by Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013). 
4. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
5. Kennedy observed, for example, that “[t]he stated purpose of the law 
was to promote an ‘interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings 
reflected in heterosexual-only marriage laws,’” id. at 2693 (majority 
opinion) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 16 (1996)), while in New 
York and other states “[t]he limitation of lawful marriage to 
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separate status, and so a stigma.”6 But any marriage law creates a 
separate status. That is a crucial point that any constitutional case 
against a legal definition of marriage must accommodate, as we will 
see. Yet Kennedy’s reasoning misses it entirely; indeed, even some 
Windsor supporters found his logic wanting.7  
For Scalia, DOMA was justified as a mundane choice-of-law 
measure. But surely more was at stake than logistics—as Scalia 
implicitly grants.8  
Less discussed than either opinion was Justice Alito’s dissent. Yet 
it has a satisfying account of the stakes and compelling legal 
reasoning, and the second thanks to the first. As he tells it, the case 
raised basic policy and value questions. To hold that DOMA violated 
equality required the Court to take a stance on reasonably disputed 
views of what makes a marriage and why marriage law matters.9 But 
on these policy and value judgments, the Constitution is mute. So in 
Alito’s view, if not his words, the Windsor Court did what critics 
have long faulted the Court for doing in Lochner v. New York:10 it 
substituted its own policy choices for electorally favored alternatives 
without a whit of constitutional warrant.  
Alito’s dissent, compared to Kennedy’s and Scalia’s opinions, was 
as compact as it was overlooked. I think it would repay closer study. 
In particular, I wish to consider its implicit charge of Lochnerizing. I 
will show that the charge sticks—and that it would apply to rulings 
against any traditional-marriage law11 on equal protection grounds.  
Along the way, I will also defend Alito’s supporting details, where 
they set the stage for my central point or support it: DOMA left state 
powers untouched, so it violated no principle of federalism; the best  
heterosexual couples . . . came to be seen . . . as an unjust exclusion.” 
Id. at 2689. 
6. Id. at 2693 (emphasis added). 
7. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Scalia Should Have Voted to Overturn 
DOMA, 108 N.W. L. REV. COLLOQUY 131, 152 (2013), http://www.la
w.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2013/12/LRColl2013n12Koppel
man.pdf (“Scalia’s most important claim is that Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion unfairly conflates opposition to same-sex marriage with hatred 
of gay people. Here Scalia is right. Opposition to same-sex marriage 
sometimes has nothing to do with devaluation of gays and lesbians.”).  
8. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, Scalia begins 
by noting that “the Constitution does not forbid the government to 
enforce traditional moral and sexual norms.” He justifies citing other 
possible purposes of DOMA on the ground that they “serve to make the 
contents of the legislators’ hearts quite irrelevant.” Id. 
9. Id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
11. That is, a law (state or federal) that limits marriage to certain opposite-
sex couples. 
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contrary argument trips on an equivocation. Congress did promote 
what it judged the best view of marriage and its social value, but it 
thereby violated no principle of equal protection. The usual equal 
protection apparatus was, as Alito wrote, “ill suited” to the case 
anyhow, for (as I will add) DOMA made benefits hinge in the first 
place on a couple’s sexual composition. And that criterion—unlike an 
individual’s sex, or a couple’s racial composition, or any familiar 
suspect classification—has an inherent link to a sound social goal. 
Neither link nor goal is socially invented or invidious. Moreover, to 
find sexual composition utterly unrelated to marriage or its social 
purposes would require the Court to choose, as Alito wrote, between 
two theories of marriage: a consent-based view that would promote 
any romantic pair-bond or a conjugal view that sees marriage as “a 
comprehensive . . . union . . . intrinsically ordered to producing new 
life” and hence “intrinsically opposite-sex.”12 Alito noted that some of 
the second view’s champions think enshrining the first would 
undermine marital norms and their socially stabilizing effects and that 
some supporters of the former agree and celebrate that prospect. I will 
offer evidence for both points. I will also show that both views are 
reasonable and legitimate. The Constitution requires neither; it 
forbids neither. That is not just an originalist point; as I will show, it 
holds on quite capacious readings of the Constitution and case law.  
I defend these points here, having addressed them variously 
elsewhere.13 And yet, in the most crucial respect, my ambitions are 
limited. I will not provide a complete defense of traditional marriage 
laws (including DOMA), even against the equal protection challenge 
alone. Again, my main concern will be to draw out and defend Alito’s 
condensed case for the idea that Windsor required a judicial choice 
between reasonably contested value and policy views, without a 
constitutional basis. If my argument is expansive, it is in showing that 
the same would hold of traditional state marriage laws—and not just 
by the case law, but on several scholars’ proposals for developing it.14  
So for all I can show here, a sound equal protection approach 
might exist that would avoid Lochnerizing. Or maybe Lochnerizing, 
pace generations of critics, is just fine—or was wrong for narrower 
reasons that would not impugn Windsor. Then again, a certain kind 
of Lochnerizing might turn out to be inevitable if courts are to carry 
 
12. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
13. See, e.g., SHERIF GIRGIS ET AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND 
WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012); Amici Curiae Brief of Robert P. George, 
Sherif Girgis, and Ryan T. Anderson in Support of Hollingsworth and 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting 
Reversal as Amici Curiae, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (No. 12-144); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307). 
14. I will not address these proposals’ merits here.  
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their current burden of equal protection enforcement. Then we must 
either reconcile ourselves to some Lochnerizing or shift more of the 
task of equal protection enforcement to Congress, on an expanded 
reading of its Section 5 powers.15 Here I mean only to shift the burden 
of proof onto Windsor’s defenders by showing prima facie that it 
Lochnerizes.  
In Part I, I argue against the most prominent federalism challenge 
to DOMA, granting along the way that DOMA’s primary purpose 
was to promote a certain view of marriage. In Part II, I examine the 
arguments that DOMA classifies by sexual orientation and by sex, 
showing the awkwardness of attempts to apply ordinary equal-
protection analysis to traditional marriage laws. Both Parts set up my 
primary thesis, elaborated in Part III and defended in Part IV, that 
an equal protection ruling against DOMA or any traditional-marriage 
law requires the Court to take positions on reasonably disputed, 
extra-constitutional value and policy judgments. To do so is to repeat 
the ways of Lochner, long decried for having substituted judicial for 
legislative policy preferences. In Part V, I argue against four ways 
drawn from cases and commentary that one might try to clear 
Windsor of the Lochner charge. 
I. Federalism 
Federalism plays a supporting role in the Court’s opinion, which 
begins with several pages on our system’s reserving to states the 
power to define domestic relations.16 While the majority ultimately 
declines to rule on the federalism challenge to DOMA,17 it does rely 
on a hybrid federalism-equal protection argument,18 which in turn 
relies (I will argue) on a direct federalism challenge posed by several 
amici in the case (the “Federalism Scholars”).19  
I consider the latter here in order to establish a premise later 
deployed against the Court’s actual reasoning, and because addressing  
15. For brief elaboration of each of these possibilities, with appropriate 
references, see Conclusion. 
16. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–93 (majority opinion). 
17. See id. at 2692 (“[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal 
intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution.”).  
18. See discussion infra Part V.B and note 40. For an alternative 
explanation of how Windsor is about individual rights despite strong 
federalist overtones, see Nancy C. Marcus, When Quacking Like a Duck 
is Really a Swan Song in Disguise: How Windsor’s State Powers 
Analysis Sets the Stage for the Demise of Federalism-Based Marriage 
Discrimination, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1073 (2014). 
19. Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
Windsor, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Brief of 
Federalism Scholars]. 
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it will bring into view the most natural reading of DOMA’s purpose, 
which will guide the rest of my argument.  
The Federalism Scholars argued that DOMA’s definition of 
“marriage” for federal law was not pursuant to an enumerated power 
of Congress.20 Nor was it “necessary and proper” for federal action.21 
The reason is that DOMA’s purpose had nothing to do with any 
federal power. It had to do rather with a state prerogative: preserving 
a certain vision of marriage (in the House Report’s words, promoting 
the “institution of traditional heterosexual marriage”22). So it violated 
principles of federalism, whatever its status under equal protection.  
The Federalism Scholars grant that in general, “defining who may 
receive a benefit is incidental to the power of conferring a benefit 
under the Spending power.”23 After all, if no particular group is 
constitutionally owed a benefit, Congress must decide who receives 
it.24 So picking the recipients of a federal benefit is both necessary and 
proper to creating it. But that is all that DOMA did, for 1,100-some 
federal benefits.25 What, then, is the harm? 
The Federalism Scholars reply that DOMA was improper because 
it assumed a federal “power to define marital status,” which is 
substantive enough that “we would expect the Constitution to 
enumerate [it] separately.”26  
But this equivocates on the meaning of “define marital status.” It 
is important to distinguish between legal and non-legal effects—or 
what I will call, respectively, policy mechanisms and social goals.  
Mechanisms are legal actions and legal effects. They include 
norms (e.g., federal rules governing interstate commerce); statuses 
(e.g., permanent residency or marriage); obligations (e.g., the 
obligation not to commit battery); rights (e.g., the right against 
unreasonable searches); or instruments for creating or changing other 
mechanisms (e.g., courts, statutes, or judicial decisions).  
 
20. Id. at 2–3 (referring, in part, to Congress’s enumerated powers under 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
21. Id. at 3 (referring to the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
22. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996). 
23. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 19, at 18. 
24. Of course, Congress is still bound by constitutional norms other than 
federalism. Thus it cannot predicate the benefit on race. But to raise 
this sort of objection is to change the subject from federalism.  
25. Dayna K. Shah, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-
353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 
(2004).  
26. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 19, at 16. 
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Social goals, by contrast, are actual or hoped-for non-legal effects 
of mechanisms. They include “public health, safety, morals, [and the] 
general welfare”;27 or “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”28  
Both mechanisms and social goals are used to distinguish state 
and federal power. Article I, Section 8 defines congressional power in 
terms of mechanisms,29 occasionally limited by a set of permitted 
social goals.30 But a common slogan defines states’ powers in terms of 
social goals: “public health, safety, morals, [and the] general 
welfare.”31 We tend to slide between these two ways of delineating 
state or federal power. 
The Federalism Scholars trade on this ambiguity in saying that 
DOMA usurped the state “power to define marital status.”32 I grant 
that defining marriage as a mechanism for allocating other state-
created mechanisms—regulating admission to marriage as a civil 
status—is traditionally a state power. But in that sense, the definition 
of marriage was untouched by DOMA. As far as state marriage 
mechanisms—licenses or legal incidents—go, DOMA did not block 
any (as Congress blocked state marijuana laws in Gonzales v. 
Raich33), coerce any (as the Court found that Congress did with 
Medicaid expansion in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebellius34), or usurp any (as federal law enforcement officials were 
found to have done in Bond v. United States35).  
But if DOMA left state marriage mechanisms entirely untouched, 
it promoted a view of marriage only socially—that is, with a view to 
shaping public opinion—and only by means of federal mechanisms.  
 
27. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
29. For example, the Constitution grants Congress the power to coin 
money, raise armies, establish post offices, etc. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8. 
30. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power 
to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States” (emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries” (emphasis added)). These social-goal specifications of 
permitted federal mechanisms will make no difference to my argument, 
so I set them aside.  
31. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. The Bill of Rights limits permitted 
social goals, but it does so for the federal and state governments alike.  
32. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 19, at 16. 
33. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
34. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
35.  572 U.S. __ (2014). 
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What the Federalism Scholars find objectionable is not DOMA’s 
use of federal mechanisms. They grant that Congress may use its own 
marriage standard if the restriction and the benefit are rationally 
linked, as with the denial of immigration benefits for fraudulent  
state marriages.36  
Their problem with DOMA, rather, is that it tailored federal 
mechanisms to a traditionally state social goal: promoting lawmakers’ 
moral vision of marriage. The Federalism Scholars infer this purpose 
from DOMA’s legislative history,37 title, and preamble38 and from its 
sweep: limiting all federal benefits to opposite-sex marriages, without 
a showing that they all have a special link to sexual 
complementarity.39 And it is to this purpose that the Federalism 
Scholars object. 
Their objection thus exposes their assumption,40 which we can 
now make plain: the Article I, Section 8 powers (mechanisms) that 
 
36. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 19, at 18-20 (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (the immigration antifraud marriage 
provision)). 
37. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. One could also infer this from 
DOMA’s apparent inspiration: indications that the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii would be the first to require state recognition of same-sex 
marriage. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (remanding 
for trial on whether state can rebut presumption of unconstitutionality 
under strict scrutiny).  
38. See Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 19, at 30 (“[DOMA] was 
deliberately drafted to express Congress’s policy judgment rejecting 
same-sex marriage—that is why it is called the ‘Defense of Marriage 
Act.’ That is why its preamble reads, ‘An act to define and protect the 
institution of marriage.’” (quoting DOMA, Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 1, 110 
Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996)). As Professor Jonathan H. Adler later put it:  
[T]he question our brief raises is not whether Congress is 
generally free to define terms in federal statutes—it is—but 
whether it is permissible for Congress to do so here for the 
purpose of advancing a traditional definition of marriage when 
the federal government lacks any independent federal interest in 
such matters.  
 Jonathan H. Adler, Debating DOMA and Federalism, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 8, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/
03/08/debating-doma-and-federalism/. 
39. See also Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars Bruce Ackerman et al. as 
Amici Curiae Addressing the Merits and Supporting Affirmance, United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Nos. 12-144, 12-307) (arguing 
that the Court should apply heightened judicial scrutiny to DOMA in 
part because sexual orientation is irrelevant to an individual’s ability to 
contribute to society). 
40. Something like it is avowed by Professor Randy Barnett in a follow-up 
piece:  
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entitle Congress to create a policy also fix the range of social goals 
allowed to shape it. That is, a federal mechanism infringes on state 
power if its features can be explained only by traditionally state social 
goals. Or again, any federal policy goal must be ultimately related 
just to enumerated powers. Call this the Federal Justifications Test.41  
Consider federal permanent residency status. It is a mechanism 
created pursuant to the Article I power “[t]o establish an uniform 
Rule of Naturalization.”42 So on the Federalism Scholars’ assumption, 
everything about this status—including its eligibility requirements—
must be related to that enumerated federal mechanism.  
And everything about it is related to establishing a system of 
naturalization. Permanent residency is a step toward naturalization. It 
is rational to make naturalization available to people somehow close 
to a U.S. citizen or other permanent resident, for which it makes 
sense to privilege spouses of citizens—on which, in turn, it is 
reasonable to consult state marriage registries. And finally, it is 
sensible to exclude those who have contracted state marriages 
fraudulently, just to obtain the federal benefit. So the immigration 
antifraud marriage provision, which limits the federal status of 
permanent residency, is related to the Article I power that entitled 
Congress to create this status in the first place. The law of permanent 
residency passes the Federal Justifications Test.  
But DOMA failed that test because, again, far from a “targeted 
limitation,” it was “a sawed-off shotgun” that “indiscriminately 
applie[d]” across the federal code.43 So it must have limited federal 
programs for a purpose unrelated to any Article I power: to promote 
 
DOMA’s sweeping and indiscriminate application to over a 
thousand federal statutes could not pass any level of equal 
protection scrutiny, even the most deferential, because Congress 
failed to identify a federal interest why each of these disparate 
federal laws should not track state laws defining marriage, as 
had previously been the case.  
 Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2
013/06/federalism-marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/. 
41. Note that the Federal Justifications Test is not about how closely 
federal action must hew to purposes that are admittedly within bounds 
for Congress. It is not, for example, about how much or how directly a 
regulation must affect interstate commerce to be justified ultimately by 
the Commerce Clause. No, the Federal Justifications Test is about 
which social goals a congressional policy, granting that it is justified by 
some enumerated power, may be further tailored to serve at all. See 
infra note 60. 
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
43. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 19, at 20. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage? 
980 
socially a certain vision of marriage, which is traditionally a state 
social goal.44  
Indeed, the Court may have been moved to apply something quite 
like this test; it grants the “constitutionality of limited federal laws 
that regulate the meaning of marriage in order to further federal 
policy,” but it questions the “far greater reach” of DOMA.45 And on 
the basis of that reach the Court infers what it considers moral 
purposes that infringe on State power.46 But is the test sound? 
As support for the Federal Justifications Test, the Federalism 
Scholars cite a Federalist Paper:  
As Alexander Hamilton recognized, “[t]he propriety of a law, in 
a constitutional light, must always be determined by the nature 
of the powers upon which it is founded.” Hamilton then stated 
that any attempt by the federal government to “vary the law of 
descent in any State” would be improper. But DOMA 
accomplishes just such an improper result by altering marital 
status conferred by the States.47  
Hamilton offers two examples of federal overreach that he says the 
Necessary and Proper Clause cannot justify: changing a state’s 
inheritance laws, and abrogating one of its taxes. But no matter how 
one thinks of these examples, both involve blocking a state 
mechanism. They do not support the Federal Justifications Test, 
which is about permissible social goals of federal mechanisms. Nor do 
Hamilton’s examples suggest problems with DOMA. In resorting to 
coercion, they are less like DOMA and more like the law struck down 
in New York v. United States,48 which tried to “commandeer the 
States’ legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact” 
federal policy.49 DOMA did not compel or limit any state mechanism. 
Not only is the Federal Justifications Test unjustified by 
Hamilton’s words or any other historical or legal authority that I can 
 
44. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“[R]egulation of domestic 
relations [is] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive 
province of the States.”). 
45. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013) (emphasis 
added). 
46. See id. at 2693 (“The stated purpose of the law was to promote an 
‘interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in 
heterosexual-only marriage laws.’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 
16 (1996))). 
47. Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 19, at 24 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
(1961))).   
48. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
49. Id. at 145. 
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see.50 It is also, I submit, unworkable, contradicted by practice, and 
unconstitutional. Thus, if a federal policy is justified by an 
enumerated power and does not aim to block or compel, coerce, or 
involve any mechanism of the states, then Congress may design it to 
serve traditionally state social goals, consistently with federalism.51  
First, the test is unworkable. It requires a federal policy’s 
justifications to be (in the Federalism Scholars’ own words) “related 
to” the enumerated power that enables Congress to pass it. Most of 
those powers are means (like the regulation of interstate commerce). 
But is not any purpose of a means related to it, precisely as an end? 
In that case, may Congress not regulate commerce even to promote 
“public health, safety, morals, and . . . the general welfare” so long as 
the regulation really serves these ends?  
If it may, then commerce regulation, for example, may be 
designed to promote any goal that a state may promote, and the 
Federal Justifications Test excludes nothing. If not, then what does 
make a purpose sufficiently related to commerce regulation that 
Congress may take it into account? For this and many clearly 
instrumental enumerated powers, the test would be intolerably 
ambiguous or toothless. 
Moreover, the Federalism Scholars concede that mechanisms are 
sufficiently related to an enumerated power if they make its exercise 
better—as the antifraud provision makes permanent residency policy a 
superior exercise of the Article I power to regulate immigration.52 But 
here the meaning of better is clearly supplied by ideas about what is 
healthy or upright or useful for society—about the very police powers 
related to public health, safety, and morals, and the general welfare 
that the Federalism Scholars want to prevent federal policy from 
being shaped to promote. Because Congress has to be free to choose 
 
50. Does United States. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno justify it? 
The Court there laments that the challenged statute (which treats 
households of related persons differently from households involving 
unrelated persons) is “irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act,” 
which have to do with interstate commerce. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
But it goes on to say that the regulation, to be constitutional, must 
therefore “further some legitimate governmental interest other than 
those specifically stated in the congressional ‘declaration of policy’”—
clearly implying that other interests could have saved the statute. Id. 
The problem with the purposes found was not that they were off-limits 
to Congress in particular, but that they violated equal protection by 
involving a “bare congressional desire to harm a political unpopular 
group.” Id.   
51. Of course, a federal policy need not meet all these conditions to avoid 
infringing on state power. I am proposing a merely sufficient condition, 
minimally drawn to show that DOMA clearly violates no principle of 
federalism. 
52. See supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.  
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among better and worse ways of exercising its enumerated powers, it 
has to be free to shape its mechanisms (once properly justified by an 
enumerated power) by the kinds of social goals available to states. 
Again, the Federal Justifications Test is unworkable. 
Second, it is clear that Congress does design policies to achieve 
purposes normally pursued by the states, and no one faults it for 
doing so on the basis of anything like the Federal Justifications Test. 
The Clean Air Act,53 the Affordable Care Act,54 the Civil Rights Act,55 
and the Controlled Substances Act56 are all justified by the authority 
to regulate interstate commerce.57 Yet they are clearly designed to 
promote public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. We 
must appeal to such purposes to explain major features of each 
statute.58 Challenges to them have charged that these acts or their 
related regulations are not, in fact, regulations of commerce.59 But 
none has granted that point while challenging the law’s having then 
been shaped to pursue traditionally state social goals: none has 
invoked the Federal Justifications Test.  
Finally, besides being unworkable and ignored, the test is 
unconstitutional. It is an extra-constitutional limit on federal power. 
Article I, Section 8 defines the line between federal and state power, 
and it is framed in terms of mechanisms. So those mechanisms (and 
 
53. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C §§ 7401–7671q (2012)). 
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 
29, and 42 U.S.C).  
55. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.)  
56. Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–971).  
57. See 42 U.S.C § 7402 (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Affordable 
Care Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)–(c) (Civil Rights Act); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 801(3) (Controlled Substances Act).  
58. See 42 U.S.C § 7401(a)(2) (Clean Air Act provision); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18091(2)(C),(I) (Affordable Care Act provisions); 78 Stat. 241, 243 
(Civil Rights Act provisions); 21 U.S.C. § 801(1) (Controlled Substance 
Act provision).  
59. See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(adjudicating a challenge to the Affordable Care Act); Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause extends to its marijuana rules of the Controlled 
Substance Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241 (1964) (holding that Congress did not exceed its power under the 
Commerce Clause in applying Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
public accommodations serving interstate travelers).  
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anything properly related to them) define the limits of federal power.60 
Once a policy fits within that scope, it may be shaped to achieve even 
social goals normally promoted by the states. The traditional formula 
of the states’ police powers is just a gloss on the more authoritative 
constitutional text; it cannot trump that text in case of conflict. 
So if federal powers justify creating the programs affected by 
DOMA, then Congress may shape their eligibility requirements to 
promote the view of marriage that it thinks best serves public values 
and the general welfare. That is what DOMA did. So we can grant 
the Federalism Scholars’ reading of DOMA’s real purposes and 
bracket the “downright boring” ones offered in Justice Scalia’s 
dissent.61 There is still no objection to DOMA based on federalism.  
The real question is whether the social goal behind DOMA was 
illegitimate in itself—whether socially promoting the traditional view 
of marriage (by DOMA’s mechanisms) violated equal protection.  
II. Classifications 
Here I elaborate on Alito’s passing suggestion that the Court’s 
equal-protection analysis of suspect classifications is “ill suited” to 
this case.62 I make two points: First, it is much easier to show that 
DOMA classified by sex than by sexual orientation. But second, 
DOMA and traditional state marriage laws crucially differ in 
structure from almost every other policy that involves classification by 
sex. And that difference makes heightened scrutiny less appropriate 
here than it has been in other sex classification cases.  
I admit that these are very modest conclusions. They offer 
tentative answers to secondary questions—not of constitutionality, 
but of how to apply the judge-made tools for determining 
 
60. It is standard to think that the Necessary and Proper Clause entitles 
Congress to enact federal mechanisms distinct from any listed as 
enumerated powers—so long as those mechanisms are sufficiently related 
to enumerated powers. But note that neither accepting nor rejecting the 
Federal Justifications Test implies a position on how closely related is 
close enough. It is one thing to say that any federal action would be 
consistent with federalism if it were tailored to serve social goal X. It is 
quite another to say whether a given federal policy counts as serving X 
at all. The Federal Justifications Test concerns the first question: which 
purposes the federal government may shape its policies to serve, without 
violating federalism. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Many 
federalism challenges—for example, to federal gun laws in United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)—concern the second question: when a 
certain federal policy counts as serving a purpose at all (granting that if 
the policy does serve that purpose, it will be consistent with federalism).  
61. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct 2675, 2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
62. Id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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constitutionality. One could accept both my points and still find 
DOMA unconstitutional, or reject them and decide the other way. I 
make them anyway for two reasons. First, as long as the Court 
applies tiers of scrutiny, it will be pertinent to ask what level it 
should apply to the state marriage laws no doubt headed for it in 
Windsor’s wake. Second, showing the structural difference between 
traditional marriage laws (including DOMA) and other sex 
classifications will set the stage for my main argument that any equal 
protection ruling against the former requires Lochnerizing. 
A. Sexual Orientation 
Both Ms. Windsor and the United States argued that DOMA 
classified by sexual orientation,63 and some judges agreed.64 But some 
on both sides of the case demurred, pointing out that DOMA made 
nothing hinge on orientation—real or imagined, assumed or avowed. If 
a man and woman married for cold convenience, even though one or 
both were bisexual or gay, DOMA would not deprive them of a single 
federal marriage benefit. If two straight men married for the same 
reason, they would be deprived of benefits.65 DOMA clearly affected 
gay people much more, but under the Court’s doctrine, disparate 
impact does not trigger heightened scrutiny.66  
Perhaps it should. Maybe the Court’s reason for declining to 
make a trigger of racially disparate impact does not generalize.67 
Maybe disparate impact indicates official classification at an earlier 
stage anyway—in the choice of policies as opposed to their operation. 
Indeed, the Court already allows judicial inferences of evil aims from a  
63. Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 15, 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307); Brief for the United States on 
the Merits Question at 52, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12–307).  
64. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–85 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
65. See Brief on the Merits for Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group of the U.S. House of Representatives at 25 n.7, Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (No. 12–307) [hereinafter BLAG Brief]; see also Andrew 
Koppelman, Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to 
Harm”, 64 Case. W. Res. L. Rev. 1045, 1053–58 (2014).  
66. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that the 
existence of a disparate impact claim alone does not “trigger the rule, 
that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny 
and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.” (citation 
omitted)). 
67. The Court feared that making disparate racial impact a basis for higher 
scrutiny would imperil countless tax, welfare, and regulatory policies, 
which disproportionately affect the poor, who are predominantly black. 
Id. at 248. But sexual orientation does not similarly track economic 
status, so arguably there would not be a similar problem with 
heightened scrutiny of policies that affect gay people more.  
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policy’s overall shape, including disparate impact.68 To block such an 
inference might seem rather formalistic. 
Or perhaps, as Professor Andrew Koppelman argues, the Court 
should (and does) apply heightened scrutiny just when a policy 
requires “officials, in allocating rights and burdens, to determine” 
certain traits’ presence “in specific cases.”69 By this standard, as we’ve 
seen, DOMA would not have counted as classifying by orientation. 
But it is equally clear that even on this more restrictive standard, it 
did classify by sex. What implications can be drawn from that?  
B. Sex 
DOMA more clearly classified by sex because it required federal 
officials to consider, for instance, Thea Spyer and Edith Windsor’s sex 
in calculating Windsor’s federal tax liability.  
Of course, levels of equal-protection scrutiny are judges’ optional 
inventions for applying a constitutional requirement. What judges 
have made, they may remake. So we could still ask whether official 
advertence to sex should suffice for higher scrutiny. Are some kinds of 
sex-classifications systematically less suspect? Is the kind employed by 
DOMA meaningfully different? 
Koppelman says no: DOMA does just what the sex-based laws 
struck down in Frontiero v. Richardson70 and Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld71 did.72 The first made benefits unequally available to Air 
Force members’ dependents. Wives of male members were 
automatically eligible, but a female member like Sharron Frontiero 
could obtain benefits for her husband only if she could show that he 
depended on her for more than half his living.73 Under the provision in 
Wiesenfeld, Steven Wiesenfeld, as a widowed father, was ineligible for 
certain Social Security benefits available to widowed mothers.74 
Some courts have tried to distinguish such policies from DOMA 
by pointing out that they treat men and women differently while 
 
68. Id. at 242; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (“We 
recognized in Shaw that . . . statutes are subject to strict 
scrutiny . . . when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated 
by a racial purpose or object.” (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 
(1993))).  
69. Koppelman, supra note 65, at 1049.  
70. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).  
71. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
72. Koppelman, supra note 65, at 1049–50.  
73. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680.  
74. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 640–41, 653.  
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DOMA does not.75 The usual reply is that the interracial marriage 
ban in Loving v. Virginia76 was defended on analogous grounds, as 
applying equally to blacks and whites. In response, some defenders 
and detractors of traditional marriage laws have argued that the 
history and structure77 of the ban in Loving showed that it 
perpetuated white supremacy (as the Court held),78 while laws 
limiting benefits to opposite-sex couples do not perpetuate  
male supremacy.79  
Other defenders of DOMA argue that though the law classified by 
sex, its sort of classification was not problematic. They analogize it to 
policies that require adverting to sex but merit no higher scrutiny, 
such as the “mirror-image” sex restrictions on bathroom use.80  
At least one defender of the sex-classification argument against 
traditional-marriage laws, Professor Clark, acknowledges that there 
are constitutional differences between sex and racial classifications 
and tries to work around this point.81 And perhaps the most expansive 
sex-discrimination case, United States v. Virginia82 (the “VMI” case), 
supports Clark’s concession when it takes such differences for granted:  
The heightened review standard our precedent establishes 
does not make sex a proscribed classification. Supposed 
“inherent differences” are no longer accepted as a ground for 
race or national origin classifications. Physical differences 
between men and women, however, are enduring: “[T]he two 
sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one 
[sex] is different from a community composed of both.” 
 
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307–08 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) (“DOMA does not discriminate on the basis of sex because it 
treats women and men equally.”) (emphasis added).  
76. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).  
77. Id. at 11 (“The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages 
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications [are] 
designed to maintain White Supremacy.”). 
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike 
and the Meaning of Marriage, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1, 82–83 (1997); 
Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian 
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 471, 492–93 (2001) (arguing that 
the sex-discrimination argument for more liberal LGBT legislation—
which the author supports—is mistaken on “sociological,” “theoretical,” 
and “moral” grounds).  
80. Craig M. Bradley, The Right Not to Endorse Gay Rights: A Reply to 
Sunstein, 70 IND. L.J. 29, 30 n.9 (1994). 
81. See Stephen Clark, Same-Sex but Equal: Reformulating the 
Miscegenation Analogy, 34 Rutgers L.J. 107, 143 (2002).  
82. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
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“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have 
come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration . . . But such 
classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or 
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.83 
But in debating the merits of easing (or differentiating) scrutiny for 
sex-based policies, courts and commentators have overlooked one 
telling structural difference between Windsor and the canonical sex-
discrimination cases. Whether or not courts should register this 
difference doctrinally, exploring it will guide the primary step of the 
equal-protection inquiry into how well DOMA could be justified by 
reference to legitimate policy goals. 
Sharron Frontiero had to clear a higher legal bar to earn benefits 
for her spouse simply because she was a woman.84 Wiesenfeld was 
ineligible for certain benefits just because he was a man.85 Under the 
challenged laws, neither plaintiff could in any way escape  
the disadvantage.  
By contrast, Ms. Windsor’s ineligibility for a tax break hinged on 
her sex only derivatively. Unlike the benefits in Frontiero and 
Wisenfeld, the tax break she sought was equally available to men and 
women:86 being a woman left the eligibility question open. In that 
sense, Ms. Windsor’s eligibility did not depend solely on her own (or 
any individual’s) sex.87 The basic criterion was a characteristic of a 
 
83. Id. at 533–34 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ballard 
v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946)). 
84. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973).   
85.  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 640 (1975).  
86. 26 U.S.C § 2056 (2006).  
87. This may explain Justice Alito’s reticence to apply any doctrine on tiers 
of scrutiny at all:  
Our equal protection framework, upon which Windsor and the 
United States rely, is a judicial construct that provides a useful 
mechanism for analyzing a certain universe of equal protection 
cases. But that framework is ill suited for use in evaluating the 
constitutionality of laws based on the traditional understanding 
of marriage, which fundamentally turn on what marriage is.  
. . . .   
. . . Windsor and the United States thus ask us to rule that the 
presence of two members of the opposite sex is as rationally 
related to marriage as white skin is to voting or a Y-
chromosome is to the ability to administer an estate. . . .  
By asking the court to strike down DOMA as not satisfying 
some form of heightened scrutiny, [they] are really seeking to 
have the Court resolve a debate between two competing views of 
marriage.  
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pair of persons: the couple to which she belonged. Specifically, it was 
the couple’s sexual composition: same sex or opposite sex.  
Of course, determining a couple’s sexual composition requires 
determining individuals’ sex; it involves treating sex as Virginia’s ban 
in Loving had treated race. But a concern with sexual composition 
differs from a direct concern with individual sex, as in Frontiero and 
Wiesenfeld, from a concern with racial composition, as in Loving; or 
from other kinds of grouping.  
After all, male and female are not just any two sexes, as black 
and white are just two races. Maleness and femaleness, and a certain 
social purpose, are necessarily inter-defined: one cannot fully explain 
either maleness or femaleness without reference to the other and to a 
certain social good. The reason is that what differentiates them are 
not just different anatomical or genetic features, but—at a deeper 
level of explanation88—their joint (basic) physical potential for a 
biological task: reproduction.89 And this task, its social value, and its 
link to sexual composition are certainly not mere social inventions. 
It is important to note that I am not simply skipping ahead to 
the question of whether DOMA’s classification is ultimately justified. 
For all I have said, it might turn out not to be. My point is about the 
best level of scrutiny, still a question of presumptions. It is that any 
particular racial (or ethnic, or religious) grouping is prima facie 
arbitrary—and its political relevance, presumptively in need of 
justification—as the male-female sexual grouping is not. In none of 
the typically suspect groupings (racial, ethnic, etc.) do the very 
categories of the group have any inherent positive (or negative) 
connection to a legitimate political end. They have such a connection, 
if at all, only in virtue of contingent and changeable social or cultural 
goals. Those goals have often been malign, so it makes sense not to 
presume their legitimacy.90  
But the male-female sexual grouping is necessarily linked, by the 
concepts involved, to a social purpose we did not simply invent and 
 
 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2716–18 (2013) (Alito, J., 
dissenting).  
88. That is, a biological or evolutionary explanation. 
89. To clarify: One can give maleness and femaleness new senses, ones that 
do not refer to the other sex and biological reproduction. But either the 
new conceptions will not pick out just the same persons or they will be 
less explanatorily powerful than conceptions that do refer to the 
opposite sex and biological reproduction. In short, any accurate and 
explanatorily satisfying account of maleness and femaleness will refer to 
the opposite sex and to biological reproduction.  
90. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
313 (1976) (suggesting that strict scrutiny applies in cases involving 
groups with a “‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’” (quoting San 
Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 28 (1973)). 
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can scarcely do without: society’s reproduction.91 In this way, 
DOMA’s sort of classification was different from any racial grouping, 
even from other sex classifications. If our very concepts of African 
American and white, for example, ever suggested any particular social 
harm (or benefit), alone or in combination, it was only because we 
had created or invented, by our conventions, the harm or the link or 
both. The same goes for perceived links between maleness or 
femaleness and most particular professions—but not between the 
male-female pair and social reproduction.  
In light of this, courts might well decide to leave in place 
heightened scrutiny of individual sexual and racial classifications, and 
of racial-composition classifications (as in Loving), while at least 
presuming the constitutionality of laws that classify by opposite-sex 
composition.  
Such a scheme would best vindicate Justice Ginsburg’s judgment 
in the VMI case that male-female “inherent” and “physical” 
differences—unlike alleged interracial differences—are a cause for 
“celebration” (though not oppression or limitation).92 What scheme 
could possibly hew to this standard more precisely than one that 
heightened scrutiny for any type of sex classification except that 
classification which targets a necessarily “celebrat[ed]”93 social end 
(survival), to which men and women’s physical differences are 
inherently linked?94 
It might be objected that this move would be in precisely the 
wrong direction, because it would plant deep in constitutional 
doctrine diseased ideas the Court has been moving to eradicate: 
“outmoded”95 gender notions like the “pervasive sex‐role stereotype,” 
repudiated by the Rehnquist Court, that “caring for family members 
is women’s work.”96 Or it could entrench what Professor Balkin calls a 
“system of social meanings” that keeps patriarchy in place by 
 
91. I do not deny what is undeniable: much in our concepts of male and 
female is socially constructed. My point is that they necessarily make 
reference also to a fact that is not (wholly) socially constructed: their 
complementarity in biological reproduction. See supra notes 79–80.   
92. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).  
93. Id. 
94. Hence, perhaps, the Court’s ambivalence about sex classifications. See, 
e.g., Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200 (1976) (opting for intermediate 
scrutiny, three years after a plurality of the Court had applied 
heightened scrutiny in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). 
95. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). 
96. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003). 
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“defin[ing] masculinity and femininity in terms of complementary 
traits and attraction to the opposite sex.”97  
This is an important concern. We cannot deny that gender 
stereotypes can be pretexts for subjugating women or unjustly 
limiting their liberty. Whether all generalizations about sex or gender 
should be repudiated has been disputed. Against this idea, some 
feminists (liberal and conservative)98 have suggested that trying to 
uproot even the most physically grounded ideas about sex would 
actually harm and demean women, by holding up the “unencumbered, 
wombless male” body as the ideal by which all are judged.99  
But however that dispute might be resolved, my proposal would 
not entrench stereotypes about what constitutes proper gender 
identity or behavior. Its premise is not that men are by definition or 
essence those attracted to women or fatherhood, so that gay or 
unattached or childless men are abnormal—nor, mutatis mutandis, for 
women. It is simply that maleness and femaleness are conceptually 
specified by men and women’s basic physical potential—not moral 
 
97. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 Yale L.J. 2313, 2361 
(1997).  
98. For claims along these lines by women across the political spectrum, see, 
for example, Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion 
Law Back into the Family Law Fold, 69 Mont. L. Rev. 409, 444 (2008) 
(“Denying that women are drawn to their unborn children, as well as to 
spending considerable time and effort rearing born children, only results 
in policies reinforcing an outdated and largely male model of social life 
and employment—a model in which no institution need ‘flex’ or change 
to allow women and men to meet children’s needs. On the other hand, 
recognizing that both men and women feel keen obligations to their 
children at the same time that they have work or school obligations to 
meet is both more realistic and a more likely premise for a successful 
argument in favor of family-friendly work and education policies.” 
(footnote omitted)); Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Wrong Turn: How the 
Campaign to Liberate Women Has Betrayed the Culture of Life, in Life 
and Learning XII: Proceedings of the Twelfth University 
Faculty for Life Conference 11, 19 (Joseph W. Koterski, ed., 
2003) (lamenting the claim that “to enjoy full dignity and rights as an 
individual, a woman must resemble a man as closely as possible. It is 
difficult to imagine a more deadly assault upon a woman’s dignity as a 
woman. For this logic denies that a woman can be both a woman and a 
full individual.”); Robin West, Concurring in the Judgment, in What 
Roe v. Wade Should Have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal 
Experts Rewrite America’s Most Controversial Decision 121, 
141–42 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (arguing that the equal citizenship 
argument for abortion rights “legitim[izes], and with a vengeance, the 
inconsistency of motherhood and citizenship itself”). 
99. Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection 
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 941 
(2011). 
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obligation or psychological need but radical physical potential100—to 
advance together an interest of any society. This is the kind of 
“undeniable difference”—like the fact that only mothers give birth—
which can justify a policy without constituting a stereotype.101 
Whether there are contrary (even overriding) reasons to leave the 
sex-discrimination doctrine alone should not, in my view, be decisive; 
I think any ruling against DOMA must Lochnerize even if it applies 
heightened scrutiny. I have nonetheless followed this excursus on 
DOMA’s form of classification because it orients the next step of  
our inquiry.  
First, it highlights that the primary equal-protection question is 
not whether the class of gay or straight persons, men or women, or 
any other set of individuals has a special link to the common good, 
but whether a certain subset of couples does. Second, it shifts the 
burden of proof onto those who would find no such link, or dismiss 
any finding of one as stereotyping. 
In Part III, I will lay out one defense of such a link—as well as a 
common (equally value-based and controversial) retort, on which I 
think the Court implicitly relied in deciding Windsor.  
III. Lochnerizing 
Consider two principles regarding the nature and value of 
marriage that would, if sound, justify state marriage laws that 
recognize only (certain) opposite-sex couples, as well as laws like 
DOMA that socially promote102 this view of marriage:  
Value Judgment Defense: Part of what gives marriage its 
distinctive kind of moral value is that it unites the whole of the 
partners: not just in heart and mind, but also bodily.103 Yet only 
coitus makes for bodily union in the relevant sense, and it is 
possible only between a man and woman. So only (certain) 
male-female bonds can realize the kind of moral value 
distinctive of marriage, whatever the moral status of other 
bonds.  
 
100. It is basic or radical (i.e., root) in that other, contingent conditions (of 
health, age, timeliness, other circumstances, and certain actions) need to 
be met for it to be realized fully in any particular case.  
101. Nguyen v. INS, 553 U.S. 53, 68 (2001). 
102. Again, by “socially promote” I mean promote with a view to shaping 
public opinion. 
103. It does not follow that relationships not involving such extensive 
personal (including coital-sexual) union are immoral. After all, most of 
the types of love we value—of parent for child or pupil for mentor; of 
siblings or best friends—involve nothing of the sort.  
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General Welfare Defense: A key part of what makes 
marriage policy socially valuable is that it benefits children, by 
making them likelier to grow up with their own committed 
biological parents—something valuable in itself, if not also 
instrumentally. But this social purpose is better served by a law 
recognizing only certain opposite-sex relationships, than by one 
that includes same-sex bonds. Indeed, the wider scheme can 
undermine that purpose by promoting a vision of marriage that 
tends to make its stabilizing norms seem like arbitrary 
impositions. So the former scheme better serves key social 
purposes of marriage policy. (As I clarify in Part IV.B.2., this 
Defense entirely prescinds from empirical debates about the 
relative merits of same- and opposite-sex non-biological 
parenting.) 
I call the conjunction of these principles the “Traditional View.” 
These are not the only possible bases for traditional-marriage laws 
or the only ones ever cited by supporters. But the first thing to note 
is that they are common kinds of reasons for any marriage policy. 
After all, parallel arguments for enacting same-sex marriage are 
common: 
Revisionist Value Judgment Defense: Part of what gives 
marriage its distinctive kind of moral value is that it unites the 
whole of the partners: not just in heart and mind, but also 
bodily. Yet any sort of consensual sex can make for bodily union 
in the relevant sense, and that is possible between any two 
adults. So any romantic pair bond can realize the kind of moral 
value distinctive of marriage, whatever the moral status of other 
bonds.  
Revisionist General Welfare Defense: A key part of what 
makes marriage policy socially valuable is that it benefits 
children, by making them likelier to grow up in a stable 
household—something valuable in itself, if not also 
instrumentally. But this social purpose is better served by laws 
recognizing any romantic pair bond than by ones that include 
only opposite-sex bonds. Indeed, the narrower scheme can 
undermine that purpose by promoting a vision of marriage that 
makes its stabilizing norms seem irrelevant for some 
relationships. So the former scheme better serves key social 
purposes of marriage policy. 
Call the conjunction of these views the “Revisionist View.” 
I will not establish here that the Traditional View is true as a 
matter of moral or political philosophy or empirical judgment, or that 
the Revisionist View is false. Instead, I will show two things:  
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1. The Traditional View is a reasonable and otherwise legitimate 
ground for DOMA.104 
2. Any equal-protection argument against DOMA105 would have 
to assume that the Traditional View is false, or the Revisionist 
true.106 
And I will assume a third point, which is nearly self-evident:  
3. However expansively construed, no aspect of constitutional 
text, structure, history, or precedent107—nor any underlying  
104. See discussion infra Part IV. 
105. The other grounds I have seen cited for a ruling against DOMA are the 
Due Process Clause’s fundamental right to marry and right to privacy. 
As for the second, the Court’s privacy jurisprudence has always been 
concerned with criminal bans. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (the use of contraceptives by spouses); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (the use of contraceptives by the unmarried); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortions); Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (same); Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (same); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (consensual sex). These all involved finding constitutional 
rights to certain kinds of private conduct. There is no clear 
extrapolation from this line of cases to a constitutional right to 
affirmative recognition of a relationship. As for the fundamental right to 
marry, any ruling on this basis would require a prior conception of the 
nature and meaning of marriage, even more obviously than an equal 
protection ruling against DOMA would. So if, as I will argue, the equal 
protection argument against traditional-marriage laws inevitably 
Lochnerizes, so would a Due Process argument. But for a response to 
what I consider the strongest argument that the fundamental right to 
marry includes more than the Traditional View, see infra note 107. 
106. See discussion infra Part V. 
107. Has the Supreme Court already rejected the Traditional View as a 
matter of constitutional law, in the course of deciding other marriage 
cases? The most frequently cited (and by far the most useful) case for 
this claim is Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The ruling held, in 
relevant part, that inmates have the same fundamental right to marry 
as anyone else because several “important attributes of marriage” 
remain available to them despite “the fact of [their] confinement” and 
the state’s “pursuit of legitimate correctional goals”; and that forbidding 
them to marry unless they had the prison superintendent’s permission 
was not reasonably related to the legitimate public purposes of 
imprisonment.  
The “important attributes of marriage” that the Court said were 
sufficient, “taken together,” to “form a constitutionally protected 
marital relationship in the prison context,” were: (i) expressions of 
commitment; (ii) exercise of religious faith; (iii) the expectation of 
consummation upon release; and (iv) legal and social benefits (like 
Social Security benefits and the legitimation of children). Could these, 
taken together, also “form a constitutionally protected marital 
relationship” between two people of the same sex?  
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constitutional value or principle—entails that the Traditional 
View is false, or the Revisionist true.  
Note that I am not taking for granted the (constitutional or legal) 
legitimacy of basing policy on the Traditional View. That would be 
to beg the question. I am simply assuming that whether the 
Traditional View (the Value Judgment and General Welfare 
Defenses) is true or false is a matter of moral and political philosophy 
and empirical judgment. It is not and never has been treated as a 
matter of constitutional law. One can accept this but argue that 
 
No. First, (iii) and (iv) show that if anything, the Court was likely 
taking for granted the background assumptions of the Value Judgment 
Defense, long embodied in the common law tradition: consummation 
was always understood to be satisfied only by coitus, and the 
legitimation of children born to a relationship is relevant only to 
opposite-sex couples.  
Second and more important, if we did bracket those hints that the 
Traditional View was being taken for granted, and tried to infer all the 
contours of the right to marriage from the other “important attributes” 
picked out by the Court, there would be no limit. Any consensual adult 
bond—including a group sexual bond, a non-romantic one, a sexually 
open one, even a deliberately temporary one—can involve some 
commitment, religious significance, and (if the state government so 
chooses) legal benefits. Yet the Turner majority was clearly not 
implying that all these bonds, too, came under the constitutionally 
protected fundamental right to marry.  
So it is obvious that Turner—a case ultimately about whether certain 
prison regulations were reasonably related to legitimate penological 
purposes—did not commit our constitutional system to a rejection of the 
Traditional View. It took for granted the background understanding of 
what the fundamental right to marriage was a right to. (It simply added 
that this right was not forfeited by prisoners and that severely 
restricting inmate marriage was not closely enough related to goals of 
rehabilitation and security to be justified.) 
Indeed, this is the pattern with most cases cited to defend a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374 (1978), for example, merely held that Wisconsin’s restriction of 
marriage by those charged with paying child support was both over- and 
under-inclusive, and thus not appropriately tailored, with respect to its 
asserted goals. It in no way impugned—as same-sex marriage supporters 
sometimes contend—the legitimacy of the State’s goal of promoting 
responsible procreation. In this and most cases that someone might cite 
as committing our constitutional tradition to a rejection of the Value 
Judgment or General Welfare Defense, I contend, the Court just reads 
off our history and traditions the basic contours of the fundamental 
right to marriage, and then examines whether a state has curbed some 
people’s access to marriage so understood, or imposed restrictions on it 
that are hard to justify by appeal to the same traditional conception of 
marriage and its public purposes.  
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enshrining the Traditional View in policy, whether the view itself be 
true or false, is unconstitutional. 
In any case, together the three points above show that to reach 
its equal-protection-based decision in Windsor, the Court had to 
assume positions on substantive value and policy judgments on which 
(a) there are reasonable and legitimate alternatives, and (b) the 
Constitution is silent. Indeed, I think the same would be true of any 
ruling against state definitions of marriage as a male-female union. 
But it is widely considered problematic for a court to assume 
positions on reasonably disputed value and policy judgments, without 
any constitutional basis. This is not just an originalist view. 
Originalists will quibble over whether “constitutional basis” can 
include evolving interpretations of constitutional text or structure, or 
its underlying values. I will argue that even loosely read, the 
Constitution does not support the value and policy judgments needed 
to complete the equal-protection argument against DOMA (or against 
a traditional state marriage law).  
I will show, in short, that the Court in Windsor was doing what it 
has been routinely criticized for having done in Lochner v. New 
York.108 The Lochner Court struck down a New York statute setting 
daily and weekly limits on the number of hours a baker could work. It 
did so on the ground that the law interfered with the freedom of 
contract inherent in the liberty component of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Holmes’s memorable 
dissent charged the Court with substituting its conservative economic 
policy judgments for those of the legislature: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large 
part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question 
whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it 
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not 
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my 
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a 
majority to embody their opinions in law. . . . The Fourteenth 
 
108. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a summary of common 
criticisms of Lochner, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A 
Centennial Retrospective, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1469, 1505–1525 (2005) 
(discussing “[h]ow Lochner [b]ecame [p]art of the [a]nti-[c]anon”) and 
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 874 & 
nn.5–6 (1987) (“The received wisdom is that Lochner was wrong 
because it involved ‘judicial activism’: an illegitimate intrusion by the 
courts into a realm properly reserved to the political branches of 
government.”). For an alternate account of Lochner’s error from the one 
identified by Justice Holmes and assumed here, see Akhil Reed Amar, 
America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and 
Principles We Live By 273–74 & 561 n.26 (2012) (“The Court’s root 
objection to [maximum-hour] laws was that they were designed to 
redistribute wealth from employers to laborers.”). 
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Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics. . . . Some [laws upheld by the Court] embody 
convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some 
may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a 
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the 
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire. It 
is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the 
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or 
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment 
upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict 
with the Constitution of the United States. 
. . . I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment 
is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a 
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair 
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would 
infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by 
the traditions of our people and our law. It does not need 
research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be 
passed upon the statute before us. A reasonable man might 
think it a proper measure on the score of health.109  
Windsor, I will show, did what Holmes accused Lochner of having 
done. It was “decided upon” a moral and political theory of marriage 
“which a large part of the country does not entertain.”110 After all, 
“the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact,”111 we might say, Mr. 
Evan Wolfson’s book on marriage.112 “A constitution is not intended 
to embody a particular [marriage] theory, whether” the Traditional or 
Revisionist View.113 “It is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views,” and “the word liberty”—or equality—is misapplied if used “to 
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion,” unless any 
reasonable person “would admit” that the statute was invidious.114 
But studying DOMA, “a reasonable man might think it a proper 
measure on the score of” public norms and the general welfare.115  
To defend this charge, I will argue first that the Value Judgment 
and General Welfare Defenses are reasonable and otherwise legitimate 
grounds for DOMA. In particular, history disproves the objection that 
 
109. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
110. Id. at 75. 
111. Id. 
112. Evan Wolfson, Why Marriage Matters: America, Equality, 
and Gay People’s Right to Marry (2005). 
113. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. at 76. 
115. Id. 
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they originated in animus against gays and lesbians,116 coherent 
philosophical117 and policy118 arguments can be adduced to show that 
they are not simply irrational, and evidence specific to DOMA shows 
that it was in fact motivated by ideas like these same Defenses.119  
But here a question arises. If we oppose having courts take 
positions on moral issues, and allow statutes to serve public morals, 
do not we risk making equal protection a dead letter? After all, every 
law serves some purpose.120 What’s to stop state lawmakers from 
calling that purpose a matter of public morals? And if they do, how 
could a court ever strike it down as invidious, without implicitly 
rejecting as false the lawmakers’ moral claim—without, that is, 
Lochnerizing?  
For example, to conclude that Virginia’s interracial marriage ban 
had a discriminatory purpose, didn’t the Loving Court have to reject 
the trial court’s moral defense of the law as respecting God’s will to 
separate the races?121 In that case, was Loving not Lochnerizing—
assuming a position on disputed moral issues about the nature of 
marriage and race? If it was not—if it was free to rule the contrary 
moral positions out of bounds—what makes Windsor different? 
Framed most generally, the questions raised here are hard: What 
is the principled difference (if any) between false but legitimate moral 
bases of legislation, and illegitimate moral bases? If there is none, how 
can we expect courts to apply equal protection without 
Lochnerizing—without deeming true or false certain value judgments 
on which the Constitution is silent?  
We can understand various equal protection theories as attempts 
to answer this question. Rather than defend an account of my own, I 
will consider four such attempts and show that each either fails to 
apply to DOMA (and state traditional marriage laws), or cannot 
justify striking it down apart from extra-constitutional value and 
policy judgments. So Part IV will defend point 1 above—that the 
 
116. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
117. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
118. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
119. See discussion infra Part IV.A.3. 
120. Robert F. Nagel, Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal 
Protection, 82 Yale L.J. 123, 124 (1972). 
121. The trial court in Loving had written:  
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay, and 
red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for 
such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that 
he did not intend for the races to mix.  
 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (citation omitted). 
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Traditional View is a reasonable and legitimate basis for 
policymaking. And Part V will defend point 2—that there is no way 
to avoid Lochnerizing on the equal-protection path to Windsor. 
Of course, there might be such a route that I have simply 
overlooked. Or Lochnerizing might be permissible after all. Or there 
might be a more specific charge that applies to Lochner—and 
captures what generations of legal observers have found wanting in 
that decision—but not to Windsor. Or the charge might stick and 
show that it would be best for at least certain equal protection 
interests to be secured by Congress, which would recommend a more 
expansive reading than the Court has allowed of Congress’s powers to 
enforce equal protection under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In short, what I offer here is not a complete 
constitutional defense of DOMA and other traditional marriage laws. 
I just aim to show what Alito suggested and many have missed: that 
there is good reason to see in Windsor key features of Lochner.  
IV. Legitimacy 
The Lochner charge challenges Windsor supporters to find a way 
for the Court to deem the Value Judgment and General Welfare 
Defenses illegitimate, whether or not true. A natural option is to claim 
that they amount to or conceal a discriminatory purpose.122 In Loving, 
for example, the Court struck down an interracial marriage ban 
because it could not be justified by any “legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious racial discrimination.”123 Do the Value 
Judgment and General Welfare Defenses just give effect to a purpose 
to discriminate against gays and lesbians?  
While history provided many grounds for ruling Virginia’s 
defenses of its interracial marriage ban pretextual or illegitimate,124 I 
 
122. See e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246–47 (1976) (“[W]hen 
hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially 
disproportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory 
purpose need not be proved, and that it is an insufficient response to 
demonstrate some rational basis for the challenged practices.”). 
123. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). 
124. As the Court in Loving explains:  
In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the 
decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
referred to its 1955 decision in Naim v. Naim, as stating the 
reasons supporting the validity of these laws. In Naim, the state 
court concluded that the State’s legitimate purposes were “to 
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,” and to prevent “the 
corruption of blood,” “a mongrel breed of citizens,” and “the 
obliteration of racial pride,” obviously an endorsement of the 
doctrine of White Supremacy. 
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will argue that history rules out the possibility that the Value 
Judgment and General Welfare Defenses originated in animus against 
gay people. Philosophical and general policy arguments bolster the 
view that these Defenses are reasonable, and evidence regarding 
DOMA in particular tends to affirm that something like them in fact 
motivated it. So the Defenses are legitimate bases for DOMA.  
A. Value Judgment Defense 
The anthropological evidence of a nearly perfect global consensus 
on sexual complementarity in marriage and certain philosophical and 
legal traditions support two conclusions.125 First, no particular religion 
is uniquely responsible for the Traditional View. And second, it 
cannot be ascribed simply to a purpose to discriminate against gays 
and lesbians, for that view—and the Value Judgment Defense in 
particular—has prevailed in societies that have spanned the spectrum 
of attitudes toward homosexuality, including ones favorable toward 
same-sex acts, and others lacking our concept of gay people as a class. 
(Whatever suffices to prove discriminatory purpose against a class, 
ignorance of the class as such surely disproves it.) Some philosophical 
and legal conceptions of marriage have even excluded certain 
 
 Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (citation omitted) (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 
S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)). Nancy F. Cott provides historical support 
for this conclusion:  
It is important to retrieve the singularity of the racial basis for 
these laws. Ever since ancient Rome, class-stratified and estate-
based societies had instituted laws against intermarriage 
between individuals of unequal social or civil status, with the 
aim of preserving the integrity of the ruling class. British 
imperial policy in Ireland in the fourteenth century included 
such a ban, and the Spanish crown in 1776 issued a similar 
decree. But the English colonies stand out as the first secular 
authorities to nullify and criminalize intermarriage on the basis 
of race or color designations.  
These laws did not concern all mixed marriages. They 
aimed to keep the white race unmixed—or more exactly, to keep 
the legitimate white race unmixed—and thus only addressed 
marriages in which one party was white. 
 Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the 
Nation 41 (2000) (footnote omitted). 
125. See, e.g., G. Robina Quale, A History of Marriage Systems 2 
(1988) (“Marriage, as the socially recognized linking of a specific man to 
a specific woman and her offspring, can be found in all societies. 
Through marriage, children can be assured of being born to both a man 
and a woman who will care for them as they mature.”); see also 
Edward Westermarck. A Short History of Marriage 1 (1926) 
(recognizing that marriage across cultures “involves certain rights and 
duties both . . . of the parties entering the union and . . . of the children 
born of it,” and “implies the right of sexual intercourse.”). 
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opposite-sex bonds (through no choice of their own), which further 
undermines the idea that they were targeting gays and lesbians.  
In this Section, then, I offer historical and philosophical points to 
show that the Value Judgment Defense cannot have arisen out of 
anti-gay animus, that a reasonable case can be made for it, and that 
something like it motivated DOMA. In the next Section, I offer a 
reasoned case for the General Welfare Defense.    
1. Intellectual and Legal Traditions 
The Value Judgment Defense could not have originated in 
bigotry. Its history belies that idea. Several classical ancient 
thinkers—including Xenophanes, Socrates, Plato,126 Aristotle,127 
Musonius Rufus,128 and Plutarch129—developed ethical frameworks 
that found special value in bonds embodied in coitus and uniquely apt 
for family life.130   
126. See, e.g., Plato, The Laws of Plato 232, 840c–841a (Thomas L. 
Pangle trans., Univ. of Chi. Press, 1988) (1980) (writing favorably of 
legislating to have people “pair off, male with female . . . and live out 
the rest of their lives” together). 
127. For Aristotle, the foundation of political community was “the family 
group,” by which he “mean[t] the nuclear family.” Alberto Maffi, Family 
and Property Law, in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient 
Greek Law 254, 254 (Michael Gagarin & David Cohen eds., 2005). For 
Aristotle, indeed, “[b]etween man and wife friendship seems to exist by 
nature,” and their conjugal union has primacy over political union. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. VIII, at 1162a15–19 (W.D. Ross 
trans., 1925)(ca. 350 B.C.E), reprinted in 2 The Complete Works of 
Aristotle 1836 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
128. He wrote that a  
  “husband and wife . . . should come together for the purpose of making 
a life in common and of procreating children, and furthermore of 
regarding all things in common between them . . . even their own 
bodies,” viewing this form of affectionate and bodily union—and not 
only its fulfillment in procreation—as desirable.  
 Musonius Rufus, Discourses XIIIA, reprinted in Cora E. Lutz, Musonius 
Rufus “The Roman Socrates,” in X Yale Classical Studies 3, 89 
(Alfred R. Bellinger ed., 1947). 
129. Plutarch attributes to Solon the view of marriage as a union of life 
between man and woman “for the delights of love and the getting of 
children.” Plutarch, Life of Solon ch. 20, § 4, reprinted in 1 
Plutarch Lives 403, 459 (G.P. Goold ed., Bernadotte Perrin trans., 
Harv. Univ. Press. 6th prtg. 1993) [hereinafter Plutarch, Solon]. And 
he himself wrote of marriage as a distinct form of “friendship,” specially 
embodied in “physical union” of coitus (which he called a “renewal” of 
marriage). Plutarch, The Dialogue on Love § 769, reprinted in IX 
Moralia 307, 427 (Edwin L. Minar, Jr. trans., T. E. Page et al. eds., 
Harv. Univ. Press. 1961). 
130. And they all denied that any sexual acts but coitus, whatever the sex of 
the parties, could seal a truly marital relationship. See John M. Finnis, 
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These thinkers were not influenced by Judaism or Christianity. 
Nor were they all ignorant of same-sex sexual relations, which were 
common, for example, between adult and adolescent males in Greece. 
Quite apart from motives of religion, ignorance, or hostility toward 
anyone, they reasoned toward the view that male-female sexual bonds 
have distinctive value. 
Indeed, the philosophical and legal principle that only coitus could 
consummate a marriage arose when the only other acts being 
considered were ones between a married man and woman. It is 
virtually impossible that this standard (or the views just mentioned) 
was motivated by animus against gays and lesbians, especially as 
these thinkers worked in contexts that lacked our concept of gay 
identity.131 Even in cultures favorable to same-sex sexual conduct, the 
Traditional View has prevailed—and nothing like the Revisionist was 
imagined.  
For hundreds of years at common law, moreover, infertility was 
not grounds for declaring a marriage void,132 and only coitus was 
recognized as completing a marriage.133 What could make sense of 
these two practices? 
If marriage were regarded as merely a legal tool for keeping 
parents together for children, clear evidence of infertility (like old age) 
would have been a ground for voiding a marriage. Or if the law were 
just targeting same-sex bonds for exclusion, it would have counted 
any sexual act between a man and woman as adequate to 
consummate a marriage. Instead, the law reflected the rational 
judgment that those unions of hearts and minds extended along the 
bodily dimension by coitus were valuable in themselves, and different 
in kind from other bonds: the Value Judgment Defense. 
2. Philosophical Account 
So history suggests that something besides religion and animus 
can motivate the Value Judgment Defense. That is reinforced by the 
fact that arguments can be and have been made to defend this view, 
as reasonable and coherent, not just historically prevalent.134   
Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation”, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1049, 1062–68 (1994). 
131.  Compare policies like Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, which it would have been 
impossible to enact in a culture that lacked our concept of sexual 
orientation. 
132. See Chester G. Vernier, 2 American Family Laws: A 
Comparative Study of the Family Law of the Forty-eight 
American States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and 
Hawaii (to Jan. 1, 1931) § 68, at 38–39 (1931). 
133. See 1 id. §§ 37, 50, at 170–72, 239–46.  
134. See, e.g., Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, Body-Self Dualism 
in Contemporary Ethics and Politics 176–217 (2009).  
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Here I summarize my own (coauthored) philosophical efforts over 
several years to defend a specific version of the Traditional View, 
namely, the conjugal view—an effort that draws on some of the 
classical thinkers mentioned above.135  
This philosophical account begins with an Aristotelian point: 
people enter a voluntary relationship by committing to engage in 
certain cooperative activities, which aim at certain shared goods. And 
they do so in the context of a commitment marked by norms 
appropriate to those shared activities and goods.  
This is what creates a voluntary relationship, or union, or 
community: a group’s commitment to pursue given goods through 
certain activities while observing certain norms. What sets the 
community of marriage apart, on this account, is that it is 
comprehensive in these three defining respects: unifying activities, 
unifying goods, unifying commitments. It is comprehensive, that is,  
(a) in the basic dimensions in which it unites two people (mind 
and body);136 
(b) in the goods with respect to which it unites them 
(procreation, and hence the broad domestic sharing fit for 
family life);137 and 
(c) in the kind of commitment that it calls for (permanent and 
exclusive).138  
a. Comprehensive Unifying Acts: Mind and Body 
If marriage unites partners in body as well as mind, what makes 
for bodily union? Many on both sides of the marriage debate would 
say sex. But why? It can foster or express emotional closeness, but so 
can other activities. Why is sex crucial for bodily union, and thus  
for marriage?  
On the philosophical view sketched here, the answer begins, 
again, with a more general account. What makes for unity is “activity 
toward common ends. Two things are parts of a greater whole—are 
one—if they act as one; and they act as one if they coordinate toward 
one end that encompasses them both.”139  
The same goes for bodily union. Thus, your organs form one body 
because they are coordinated toward the one biological end of 
sustaining your biological life.  
 
135. Girgis et al., supra note 13. 
136. Id. at 25–28.  
137.  Id. at 28–32. 
138. Id. at 32–34. 
139. Id. at 25. 
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Just so, two people unite bodily when they are “coordinat[ed] 
toward a common biological end of the whole.”140 That happens only 
in coitus. In that first step of the reproductive process, a man and a 
woman are coordinated toward a biological end (reproduction) of the 
whole (the couple). Achieving the end would deepen the bodily union, 
but the coordination is enough to create it.  
Yet no other act between two people involves coordination toward 
a single biological end. So this conception of marriage as 
comprehensive union—which suggests that marriage must involve the 
partners’ bodily union, which in turn is modeled on bodily union 
within an individual—provides a basis for affirming (inter alia) that 
only a man and woman can form a marriage.  
b. Comprehensive Unifying Goods: Procreation and Domestic Life 
Again, then, marriage unites partners in body and mind, and is in 
that sense uniquely encompassing or comprehensive. But because it is 
oriented to children and family life, marriage also uniquely calls for 
the wide-range sharing of domestic life.  
The connection between marriage and parenthood is intuitive, but 
easily misunderstood. Of course children are not sufficient to create 
marriage, but they are also not necessary. Yet, many think, the 
prospect of children shapes the norms and expectations of married 
life. The philosophical account I defend explains why. 
“Procreation . . . fulfills and extends a marriage, because it fulfils and 
extends the act that most embodies a marriage: [coitus], the 
generative act.”141 
That is, coitus by its nature (i.e., apart from people’s subjective 
goals) is a coordination toward procreation. So the act that makes 
marital love is also the kind of act that makes new life. Thus marriage 
itself—the relationship most embodied by that act—is extended by 
children where they come, and in all cases by the wide-range sharing 
of domestic life uniquely apt for family life. 
But this inherent orientation to family and domestic life is unique 
to male-female conjugal bonds. Any connection to family life in other 
pairings or groups is just a matter of the partners’ choice to band 
together to rear children—which can occur even in non-romantic 
bonds (say, between a widowed mother and her sister who moves in 
to help rear the child). Only for male-female conjugal bonds is there 
an inherent connection to fulfillment in family life.142  
So this second sense in which marriage is reasonably seen as 
comprehensive—that it is inherently oriented to the comprehensive 
 
140. Id. at 25.  
141. Id. at 30.  
142. See id. at 31–32.  
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sharing of domestic life—also provides a reasonable basis for affirming 
that only a man and woman can form a marriage. 
c. Comprehensive Commitment: Norms of Permanence and Exclusivity 
Finally, on this account, the kind of commitment people should 
pledge in a given bond, depends on its defining forms of cooperation 
and shared goods. Thus, a bond comprehensive in the above two 
senses—in the dimensions of the partners united (body and mind), 
and in the range of goods toward which they are united (all domestic 
life)—inherently calls for comprehensive commitment. Through time, 
that means permanence; at each time, exclusivity.143 
This requirement of comprehensive commitment rationally fits the 
idea of marriage as comprehensive union, but it also serves a crowning 
good of marriage—procreation—by excluding infidelity and divorce. 
Other groups (two men, two women, any three or more) cannot 
form a bond comprehensive in the two senses mentioned, and hence 
have no objective basis to decide to pledge total commitment (as 
opposed to whatever they might prefer).144  
In short, a single concept—comprehensive union—can give 
coherence to the features of marriage that many people on both sides 
of the debate want any account to preserve: permanence, exclusivity, 
sexual union, a link to family life. Yet that same conception of 
marriage also implies that marriage is possible only in male-female 
bonds.  
This makes it even less likely that various cultural and 
intellectual traditions converged on the special value of opposite-sex 
bonds only by religion or animus or accident. Rather it suggests 
reasonable grounds for affirming that value, based on understandings 
of marriage shared by both sides of the traditional-revisionist debate. 
3. DOMA’s Particular Purposes 
Of course, the fact that traditional-marriage laws were enacted 
centuries before the rise of the modern concept of gay identity, when 
anti-gay animus could not possibly have motivated them, does not 
prove that the available benign motives led to DOMA’s enactment in 
1996. Even if traditional-marriage laws can have legitimate aims, were 
DOMA’s purposes yet illegitimate?  
To suggest that DOMA’s drafters had illegitimate subjective 
motives, critics point to a House Report statement that Justice Kagan 
quoted to great effect during oral arguments: “Congress decided to 
reflect an honor of collective moral judgment and to express moral 
 
143  Id. at 34. 
144.  Id. 
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disapproval of homosexuality.”145 But as we have seen, the same 
House Report—as well as the statute’s title, preamble, and 
generality—supports the judgment that its drafters were motivated at 
least as much by the desire to affirm and socially promote the 
traditional view of marriage as such.146 And we have already seen that 
this goal, in itself, is neither off-limits to Congress nor illegitimate. 
Now it is contentious enough to hold that a law can be struck 
down for its drafters’ actual motives, even if an identical law could 
have been passed on legitimate grounds. Then Congress could reenact 
the same law the next day, following only a change of heart. 
Constitutionality, it seems, should not hinge on acts of contrition, and 
the Court has held as much.147 But even if one thinks that lawmakers’ 
actual motives can make their policies unconstitutional, and that 
moral disapproval of private conduct is an illegitimate motive, it 
cannot be enough that the law’s drafters had constitutionally mixed 
motives. That would threaten a policy whenever any of its voters was 
motivated by, say, desire for revenge against political foes. But as 
we’ve seen, the same forms of evidence that DOMA’s opponents cite 
as indications of bad motives also suggest perfectly legitimate ones. 
Andrew Koppelman takes the more promising tack of arguing 
that apart from its drafters’ subjective goals, a law can have an 
“objective purpose,” and that it was DOMA’s purpose in this sense 
that was illegitimate. Objective purpose, Koppelman argues, can be 
gleaned from the law’s text, read against historical context and the 
body of then-existing laws. Of DOMA, he says: 
The most pertinent context is the fact that when the law was 
enacted, gay people were still the objects of pervasive, and more 
importantly, unquestioned prejudice. A few years before, when 
newly elected President Bill Clinton tried to end their exclusion 
from the military, the public reaction was so negative that he 
had to settle for the lousy, and now abandoned, “don’t ask, 
don’t tell” compromise. That prejudice is easily inferred from 
“the text itself, consistently with the other aspects of its 
context.” Read in light of the entire U.S. Code that it amends 
and the culture in which it was enacted, the law’s central 
 
145. Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12–307) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146. See supra notes 32–41 and accompanying text.  
147. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a 
familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike 
down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit 
legislative motive.”). 
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purpose is “to disparage and to injure” gay people at every 
opportunity, by any available means, heedless of the cost.148 
Here Koppelman aims to assimilate Windsor in a certain respect to 
Loving. Just as the latter relied on context to find illegitimate 
purposes in Virginia’s marriage ban, without having to search the 
hearts of Virginia lawmakers, so could the Windsor Court have done 
with DOMA. How well does the comparison hold up? 
 Koppelman’s proposed standard could not really be as general as 
this: if a policy disadvantages a group (e.g., economically), and it was 
passed at a time of significant popular hostility toward that group, 
then the policy is unconstitutional. For this would prove too much.  
 Take a simple example. Say an act repeals scholarships meant to 
enable students from low-income backgrounds to attend local private 
schools.149 No one disputes that the repeal puts poor—and 
disproportionately minority—students and families at a disadvantage. 
It does so when appreciable segments of the population still harbor 
prejudice against the same groups. Is the act unconstitutional? Of 
course not. That is not simply because the legislature had no 
obligation to provide funds in the first place. The problem is that 
there is no uniquely tight fit between the repeal and the concurrent 
cultural prejudice. Support for public schools is an entirely plausible 
and complete explanation of the repeal.  
 So someone seeking to apply Koppelman’s objective-purpose 
analysis against DOMA must produce evidence not just of concurrent 
hostility toward gays and lesbians, but of a very tight fit between 
DOMA’s objective features and such hostility—the sort of fit that the 
Court rightly found in Loving between Virginia’s marriage ban and 
the social goal of “White Supremacy.” 
 Assume, in other words, that all the evidence Koppelman points 
to indicates that many in 1996 harbored animus against gay people. It 
remains to be argued that this animus shaped DOMA—that any 
believable construal of DOMA’s (objective) purpose, based on its 
 
148.  Koppelman, supra note 7, at 142–143 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012)). I note that while in 
this last sentence, Koppelman echoes Justice Kennedy’s judgment that 
the law’s purpose was to injure and disparage gay people, in the very 
next he says “[t]he impact on gay people was far from Congress’s mind 
when [DOMA] was enacted.” Id. at 143. 
149. Of course, the case is not far from real life. President Barack Obama 
and congressional Democrats have sought to limit and eventually end 
congressional support for tuition vouchers to low-income families in the 
District of Columbia. Bill Turque and Shailagh Murray, Obama Offers 
Compromise on D.C. Tuition Vouchers, Washington Post, May 7, 
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05 
/06/AR2009050603852.html. 
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objective features, would have to cite a desire to denigrate gay people. 
Indeed, as we have seen, perfectly legitimate alternative bases exist: 
the Value Judgment and General Welfare Defenses. They are not just 
abstract possibilities but had to be purposes of traditional marriage 
laws at some point. They are consistent with the cultural and legal 
context of DOMA’s passage and were even reflected in its prefatory 
materials and legislative history. Nothing of the sort could be said in 
defense of the marriage ban in Loving—which, for one thing, could 
not have been created in cultures ignorant of the concept of race, as 
traditional marriage laws were in ignorance of sexual orientation. For 
many reasons, then, a benign reading of that ban’s purpose was, as 
Koppelman writes, simply not “believable.” And that is why the 
Loving Court was entitled to find in it an invidious objective purpose.  
Koppelman, implicitly aware of these disanalogies, ends up resting 
his case against DOMA on its effects—in particular, on an alleged 
wild mismatch between its hoped-for legal effects and its legal 
disadvantages for gay people. But as I will show, this argument must 
either overlook DOMA’s social effects or implicitly reject the Value 
Judgment and General Welfare Defenses—i.e.,  Lochnerize.150 This 
bodes ill for the claim that while traditional-marriage laws can be 
legitimate, DOMA in fact had fatally malign purposes.  
B. General Welfare Defense 
In many lower-court cases striking down DOMA, the judgment 
hinged on the idea that between DOMA and asserted state interests, 
there is no rational link. So the courts in question granted:  
(a) That (some of) the purposes of DOMA asserted by the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”)  are legitimate. 
(b) That (federally) recognizing opposite-sex relationships 
(“OSR”) does advance those purposes.  
(c) Perhaps even that (federally) recognizing OSR advances 
them more than recognizing same-sex relationships (“SSR”) 
would. 
But the same courts then denied that excluding SSR itself advances 
those interests (more than including SSR would). How the state treats 
one relationship, it was supposed, cannot affect the decisions or 
behavior of another.151  
 
150. See discussion infra Part V.D. 
151. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 337 
(D. Conn. 2012) (“[T]he Court finds that no rational relationship exists 
between the denial of federal marital benefits to same-sex married 
couples and the objective of discouraging extra-marital procreation.”); 
Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 404 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d 
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The General Welfare Defense, of course, flies in the face of this 
assertion. Here is a quick defense of that Defense.  
It is reasonable to think the following: (i) the law shapes culture, 
which shapes individual choices; (ii) legally recognizing same-sex 
bonds for federal or state purposes would culturally promote the ideas 
that what defines marriage is a certain emotional union for the 
partners’ personal fulfillment; and that biological parenting is not 
special or ideal; and (iii) the more people embraced and lived by these 
ideas, the less of a chance children would have of growing up with 
their own, committed biological parents—which is a loss in itself, if 
not also harmful in other ways.  
So it is reasonable for lawmakers to think that legally recognizing 
same-sex bonds as marriages might undermine important social 
goals—just as the General Welfare Defense holds.  
1. Law, Culture, Practice 
It is a truism that the law teaches. It shapes culture, which 
shapes our expectations and, ultimately, our choices.  
Any marriage policy, in particular, can teach a view of marriage 
by its choices of which bonds to include and which to exclude. It may 
encourage people to think that marriage is most set apart, or defined, 
by what the marriage-eligible relationships have in common and what 
the ineligible ones lack. And the more people absorb the law’s lessons 
about what marriage is and requires, the more their behavior will 
tend to match those lessons.  
Thus, Joseph Raz, an Oxford philosopher who opposes 
traditional-marriage laws, argues: 
[O]ne thing can be said with certainty [about recent changes in 
marriage law]. They will not be confined to adding new options 
to the familiar heterosexual monogamous family. They will 
change the character of that family. If these changes take root 
in our culture then the familiar marriage relations will 
disappear. They will not disappear suddenly. Rather they will 
be transformed into a somewhat different social form, which 
responds to the fact that it is one of several forms of bonding, 
and that bonding itself is much more easily and commonly 
dissoluble. All these factors are already working their way into 
the constitutive conventions which determine what is 
 
699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (“Yet DOMA 
has no direct impact on heterosexual couples at all; therefore, its ability 
to deter those couples from having children outside of marriage, or to 
incentivize couples that are pregnant to get married, is remote, at best. 
It does not follow from the exclusion of one group from federal benefits 
(same-sex married persons) that another group of people (opposite-sex 
married couples) will be incentivized to take any action, whether that is 
marriage or procreation.”). 
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appropriate and expected within a conventional marriage and 
transforming its significance.152  
Several scholars corroborate this by noting that the introduction of 
another policy—no-fault divorce laws—yielded “new norms and 
expectations for marriage and family commitments in our society.”153 
They not only reflected previous social changes but “opened the door 
for some couples who would not have taken that step [into divorce] 
without the new liberalization.”154 A recent review of two dozen 
empirical studies found evidence that no-fault divorce laws increased 
rates of divorce.155 In short, empirical findings, reasoned reflection, 
and common sense converge: marriage law can affect social behavior.  
2. Marriage, Stability, and the Next Generation 
Changes in policy toward the revisionist view might undermine 
the stabilizing norms of marriage in the public mind and hence, over 
time, children may be less likely to grow up knowing the committed 
love of their own biological parents.  
If marriage is revised to include—whether for federal or state 
purposes—gay and lesbian partnerships, it will include the romantic 
union of two men or two women, but not (say) the platonic bond of a 
widow and her sister living together to raise the widow’s child. So its 
distinguishing feature—what any romantic pair has that these sisters 
lack—will be emotional (romantic) union. As the law promotes that 
new vision, people will over time absorb and come to live by it. 
But if romantic attachment is what defines a marriage, how could 
it be healthy or authentic to remain married once attachment waned, 
or grew for another? Why could not three or more be united in a 
single emotional bond? If some people felt that their emotional bond 
was enhanced by sexual openness, would not it (on the revised view of 
marriage) be harmful for them to pledge sexual exclusivity?   
152. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 393 (1986). For more, 
consult the work of Nancy Cott, a same-sex marriage advocate and 
historian. See Nancy Cott, supra note 124, at 8 (arguing that “[i]n 
shaping an institution like marriage, public authorities work by defining 
the realm of cognitive possibility for individuals as much as through 
external policing”). 
153. Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Law Revolution and the 
Transformation of Legal Marriage, in Contemporary Marriage: 
Comparative Perspectives on a Changing Institution 301, 305 
(Kingsley Davis ed., 1985). 
154. William J. Goode, World Changes in Divorce Patterns 144 
(1993). 
155. See Douglas W. Allen & Maggie Gallagher, Does Divorce Law Affect the 
Divorce Rate? A Review of Empirical Research, 1995–2006, iMAPP 
(July 2007), http://www.marriagedebate.com/pdf/imapp.nofault.divrate
.pdf. 
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Thus, changing civil marriage might further entrench what Johns 
Hopkins sociologist and same-sex marriage supporter Andrew Cherlin, 
among others, calls the “expressive individualist” model of marriage.156 
On this model, he says, a relationship that no longer fulfills you 
personally is “inauthentic and hollow,” and you “will, and must, move 
on.”157 So it is no surprise when another study finds evidence that 
“conflict and divorce” tend to be higher where spouses internalize this 
view of marriage as primarily about emotional union.158 
After all, the more people think that what sets marriage apart is 
emotional regard (which can be inconstant), or that marriage is for 
individualist expression (which can be hampered by sexual fidelity), 
the harder it may be for them to see reason to pledge or live by 
permanence or exclusivity. In other words, reasoned reflection 
suggests that these norms have no basis of principle if marriage is an 
emotional union. So they might come to seem just as arbitrary to 
expect of all types of marriages as sexual complementarity now seems 
to same-sex marriage advocates.  
But if law and its cultural effects often shape people’s behavior, 
then these changes might further erode people’s adherence to marital 
norms. That is, promoting the Revisionist View of marriage might 
risk further undermining the stabilizing norms that justify state 
involvement in marriage at all. At least, it could undercut social 
efforts to increase observance of these norms—by more formally 
promoting a view of marriage that cannot make sense of them.  
In fact, it is not just reflection on the implications of promoting 
the revisionist view of marriage (or the sociology of no-fault divorce or 
of expressive individualism) that supports this concern. The basis for 
anticipating harmful consequences becomes still more reasonable when 
we consider revisionists’ own arguments and recent legal and policy 
developments, as well as preliminary social science.  
Thus, since the rise of same-sex marriage advocacy, prominent 
gay writers (like Andrew Sullivan,159 Dan Savage,160 and Michelangelo 
Signorile161) have argued—even in mainstream venues like the New 
York Times—that redefining marriage could and should encourage  
156. Andrew J. Cherlin, Marriage-Go-Round: The State of 
Marriage and the Family in America Today 29 (2009). 
157. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).  
158. W. Bradford Wilcox & Jeffrey Dew, Is Love a Flimsy Foundation? 
Soulmate Versus Institutional Models of Marriage, 39 Soc. Sci. Res. 
687, 697 (2010).   
159. Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal: An Argument about 
Homosexuality 202–03 (Vintage Books ed., 1996) (1995). 
160. Mark Oppenheimer, Married, with Infidelities, N.Y. Times, July 3, 
2011, § MM (Magazine), at 22.  
161. Michelangelo Signorile, Bridal Wave, Out, Dec.–Jan. 1994, at 68, 161. 
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sexually “open” marriages throughout society. Temporary renewable 
marriage licenses have been advocated162—and considered by 
lawmakers.163 “Throuples,” or committed three-person bonds, have 
been sympathetically profiled in magazines.164 More than 300 LGBT 
and allied activists and scholars (some quite prominent) have 
advocated legally recognizing multiple-partner, sexually open, and 
expressly temporary bonds.165 Some have expressly embraced the goal 
of weakening the institution of marriage by the recognition of same-
sex bonds.166 One respected philosopher has argued for a “minimal 
marriage” policy allowing any number and mix of partners to 
determine their own rights and duties.167 Thus, the efforts of same-sex 
marriage supporters to work out the implications of their own views, 
and steady trends in their advocacy, lend still further rational support 
to the concern that enacting same-sex marriage would undermine, in 
principle and in practice, other stabilizing norms of marriage.  
These developments in advocacy and policy do not prove 
decisively that promoting the Revisionist View of marriage would 
weaken norms like permanence or exclusivity. But they make it ever 
more reasonable to think that it might.  
By a similar mechanism, promoting the Revisionist View might 
discourage (further) the view that there is any distinct value to being 
reared by one’s own biological parents. For the law would be treating 
as similar in every relevant respect, relationships that by nature and 
quite conspicuously cannot provide a child with her own biological 
parents. But the obscuring of these ideals might diminish the social 
pressures and incentives for husbands to remain with their wives and 
children, or for men and women having children to marry first—much 
as previous policy changes arguably have done.168  
That is, both the promotion of marriage as distinguished by 
emotional union and the demotion of the ideal of biological parenting 
 
162. Paul Rampell, Till Wedleases Do Us Part, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 2013, 
at A13.  
163. Christina Ng, Mexico City Considers Temporary Marriage Licenses, 
ABC News, Sept. 30, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/20
11/09/mexico-city-considers-temporary-marriage-licenses/. 
164. Molly Young, He & He & He, N.Y. Mag., Aug. 6, 2012, at 30. 
165. Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our 
Families & Relationships, BeyondMarriage.org (July 26, 2006), 
http://beyondmarriage.org/BeyondMarriage.pdf. 
166. Ellen Willis, Can Marriage Be Saved?. The Nation, July 5, 2004, at 16 
(“[C]onferring the legitimacy of marriage on homosexual relations will 
introduce an implicit revolt against the institution into its very heart.”). 
167. Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What Political Liberalism Implies 
for Marriage Law, 120 Ethics 302, 303 (2010). 
168. See Allen & Gallagher, supra note 155. 
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might lead to fewer stable households led by biological parents. But if 
there is distinctive value in growing up with one’s own biological 
parents, then this is a harm in itself—even if studies end up showing 
no difference between same- and opposite-sex adoptive parenting. So 
this is a point that prescinds from those empirical debates. 
3. Children and the Common Good 
Finally, it is reasonable to think that there is distinctive value in 
being reared by one’s biological parents.  
Aside from empirical studies suggesting that married biological 
parenting produces, on balance, the best outcomes, there are cogent 
reasons for thinking that it has value in itself. Thus, New York 
University philosophy Professor J. David Velleman asks us to imagine 
“a woman who would like to have the experience of conception and 
childbirth without incurring the responsibility for raising a child.”169 
On his view, she would be wronging the child. 
Velleman defends this idea by arguing that it is valuable—better 
for us, other things being equal—to grow up tied to our biological kin 
and history. For these are critical, he thinks, to most people’s 
“identity formation,” “the telling of [their] life-story.”170 He continues: 
I opened with the story of my Russian ancestors, whose search 
for something better I imagined to have culminated in my 
writing this essay. My family background includes many such 
stories, whose denouement I can see myself undergoing or 
enacting.  
. . . . 
. . . Of course, my own life provides narrative context for many 
of the events within it; but my family history provides an even 
broader context, in which large stretches of my life can take on 
meaning, as the trajectory of my entire education and career 
takes on meaning in relation to the story of my ancestors.171  
 
169. J. David Velleman, Family History, 34 Phil. Papers 357, 374 n.10 
(2005). The context is worth providing:  
Children can of course be successfully reared by single 
mothers, if necessary. But children can be successfully 
reared, if necessary, in orphanages as well—a fact that 
cannot justify deliberately creating children with the 
intention of abandoning them to an orphanage. . . . Just as 
the serviceability of orphanages cannot justify procreation in 
reliance on their services, so the serviceability of single 
parenting cannot justify the creation of children with the 
intention they grow up without a father of any kind. 
Id. 
170. Id. at 375. 
171. Id. at 375–76. 
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Velleman’s philosophical account has some empirical backing.172 Of 
course, it is possible to disagree with his claim. What is not plausible 
is to dismiss it as a cover for bigotry. It is, after all, encoded in the 
presumption of our law, and that of nearly every culture, that parents 
are responsible for their biological children.173 So the General Welfare 
Defense is, like the Value Judgment Defense, reasonable and 
legitimate, whether true or not. 
V. Avoiding Lochner? 
Here I consider four attempts to rule against DOMA on equal 
protection grounds without ruling the Traditional View of marriage 
true, or the Revisionist View false—without Lochnerizing.  
The first attempt would grant the truth and rationality of the 
Traditional View, but infer discriminatory intent from DOMA’s 
apparent lack of fit with that view, in light of its recognition of 
infertile opposite-sex marriages (“Infertility Objection”). The second 
would grant the same things but infer discriminatory intent from 
DOMA’s failure to defer to state definitions (“Windsor’s Hybrid 
Argument”). The third would aim to bracket the truth of the 
Traditional View, its compatibility with federalism, and even the 
subjective goals of its proponents, but argue that DOMA is an 
example of class or caste legislation (“Balkin’s Stratification 
Argument”). And the last would grant the truth and rationality of 
the Traditional View, its compatibility with federalism, its drafters’ 
benign purposes, and even its general compatibility with social 
equality, but infer unconstitutional callousness toward gays and 
lesbians from the alleged disproportion between DOMA’s avowed 
benefits and its costs (“Koppelman’s Depraved Heart Argument”). 
A. Infertility Objection 
Even if the Value Judgment and General Welfare Defenses are 
legitimate, of course, they might be mere pretexts for DOMA and 
other traditional-marriage laws. In Loving, for example, the interracial 
marriage ban’s true purpose was inferred partly from its structure: 
“The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving 
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand 
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White 
Supremacy,” and could not have been intended to promote, say, the 
 
172. See, e.g., Elizabeth Marquardt et al., Instit. for Am. Values, 
My Daddy’s Name is Donor: A New Study of Young Adults 
Conceived through Sperm Donation 5, (2010) (seeking “to learn 
about the identity, kinship, well-being, and social justice experiences of 
young adults who were conceived through sperm donation.”). 
173. See Quale, supra note 125, at 2.  
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“racial integrity” touted by the statute’s title as a general goal.174 
Similarly, might DOMA’s inclusion of infertile opposite-sex couples 
not prove that the real purpose is to oppress gay people?  
But by the ethical framework rationally defended in Part IV.A.2. 
and traced in Part IV.A.1 through centuries of philosophical and legal 
reflection, (1) an infertile man and woman can still form a 
comprehensive (bodily as well as emotional) union, which differs only 
in degree from fertile ones before or after children. So that framework 
provides a basis for thinking that recognizing such infertile unions has 
(2) none of the costs of recognizing same-sex bonds, most of the 
benefits of recognizing fertile ones, and at least one extra benefit. 
1. Still Marital 
To form a true marriage on the philosophical view explored in 
Part IV.A.2., a couple needs to establish and live out the 
(1) comprehensive (i.e., mind-and-body) union that (2) would be 
completed by, and be apt for, procreation and domestic life and so 
(3) inherently calls for permanent and exclusive commitment.  
Every male-female couple capable of consummating their 
commitment can have all three features. With or without children, on 
the wedding night or years later, these bonds are all comprehensive in 
the three senses specific to marriage, with its distinctive value. No 
same-sex or multiple-partner union is.  
After all, even an infertile couple can pursue bodily union, by 
bodily coordination: by engaging in the first stage of the reproductive 
process, whether or not later stages lead to conception. Such a 
couple’s bond, too, being sealed by the kind of act that makes new 
life, would be fulfilled by procreation and family life. And being 
comprehensive in both these senses, it would still, on this account, 
objectively call for comprehensive commitment. 
Accordingly, among the ancient philosophers covered in 
Part IV.A.1., Plutarch affirmed that infertile coitus could seal or 
embody a marriage,175 which the others never denied. So neither the 
contemporary philosophical view articulated above, nor its 
philosophical predecessors, would deny that infertile bonds are 
marital.  
2. Social Effects 
For this reason, recognizing infertile conjugal unions would, on 
the reasonable views described above, have none of the costs of 
redefining marriage. Since infertile couples can form a marital bond, 
recognizing them need not be expected to have the social costs of 
 
174. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating a Virginia anti-
miscegenation statute titled “An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity”). 
175. Plutarch, Solon, supra note 129, at ch. 20, § 3. 
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recognizing same-sex or other non-marital unions. It need not 
undermine the public’s grasp of the nature of marriage as a 
comprehensive union. Nor need it undermine the norms grounded in 
that nature, by socially defining marriage by romantic attachment.  
Moreover, many couples believed to be infertile end up having 
children, who are served by their parents’ marriage; and trying to 
determine fertility would require unjust invasions of privacy. 
But even an obviously infertile couple can for reasons of principle 
grounded in objective features of their union live out all the essential 
features of conjugal marriage. Their example in doing so may 
encourage fertile couples to live out such a comprehensive union 
(including its stabilizing norms), thus benefitting children.  
Finally, and perhaps most critically, recognizing only fertile 
marriages might promote the idea that marriage is valuable only as a 
means to create children—and not good in itself, as it is common and 
reasonable to think based on the views described above.176 So from 
this perspective, extending recognition to infertile marriages serves 
one purpose better than recognizing only fertile ones: to teach the 
view contained in the Value Judgment Defense that marriage 
(conjugal union) is valuable in itself. In fact, even the institution’s 
instrumental benefits for children (captured in the General Welfare 
Defense) recommend recognizing infertile conjugal unions as 
marriages, since couples seeing marriage as purely instrumental to 
children might well have a less stable bond, which harms any 
resulting children. 
Thus, neither the affirmative philosophical views of what marriage 
is, nor the policy arguments against redefining marriage, would urge 
excluding infertile opposite-sex bonds. 
B. Windsor’s Hybrid Argument 
Of course, the Windsor majority did not expressly adopt a 
position on either the Value Judgment or the General Welfare 
Defense. Did it find a route around these two principles to an equal 
protection violation?  
Randy Barnett—one of the Federalism Scholars—has convincingly 
argued that it relied on a hybrid of federalism and equal protection 
concerns (the “Hybrid Argument”).177 It held that DOMA violated 
equal protection principles to which the Fifth Amendment subjects 
federal policy178 because DOMA sought “to injure the very class New  
176. See Musonius Rufus, supra note 128; Part IV.A.1. 
177. Barnett, supra note 40. In fact, I have omitted part of his analysis, 
which I find less convincing, but the main outlines of the arguments 
stated here can be attributed to Barnett. 
178. See U. S. Const. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 
(1954), supplemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that although the 
Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, as does 
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York seeks to protect”—couples in same-sex marriages.179 But this 
judgment was based on an application of heightened equal protection 
scrutiny. And what justified higher scrutiny was a federalism concern: 
i.e., the fact that DOMA departed from the federal government’s 
practice of deferring to state marriage definitions.180 
Indeed, the Court’s summary statements of DOMA’s infirmity 
always combined mentions of harm or illicit purpose with federalism 
talk. It observed that DOMA “impose[d] a disadvantage . . . upon all 
who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned 
authority of the States.”181 And it faulted DOMA for “diminishing the 
stability and predictability of basic personal relations the State has 
found it proper to acknowledge and protect.”182 
The Court concluded, in short, that DOMA was discriminatory 
because it served no legitimate purpose, for Congress had no 
(sufficiently) legitimate reason to deviate from New York’s decision 
about the Windsor-Spyer marriage.183  
But this charge is ambiguous, and it faces a dilemma: Either 
(1) Congress had no legitimate reason to deviate from whatever New 
York happened to decide, or (2) it had no legitimate reason to deviate 
from what New York actually decided: i.e., from the recognition of 
same-sex couples in particular.  
 
the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the States, the federal 
government is effectively bound by both). 
179. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The 
avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to 
impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who 
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned 
authority of the States.”). 
180. “In determining whether a law is motived by an improper animus or 
purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ especially require 
careful consideration.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). The Court continues by noting that:  
DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of 
recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage here 
operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and 
responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their 
marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose 
and effect of disapproval of that class.  
 Id.  
181. Id. (emphasis added). 
182. Id. at 2694 (emphasis added). 
183. See id. at 2692 (“What the State of New York treats as alike the federal 
law deems unalike by a law designed to injure the same class the State 
seeks to protect.”). 
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The case for (2) must be just that it is invidious for law (federal 
or state) to promote the Traditional View—an argument which, I 
have argued, inevitably Lochnerizes. This leaves (1).  
But if the Court cannot, without Lochnerizing, show the 
Traditional View invidious, that View is legitimate in itself. Then the 
only basis for (1) is that the Traditional View is an illegitimate 
ground for federal action—namely, the federalism argument rejected 
in Part I. Apart from something like the Federal Justifications Test, 
what reason would there be for requiring the federal government to 
forfeit its chance to promote a vision of marriage? An even more free-
floating requirement that the federal government defer to state action 
within any sphere of common interest would be even less defensible.  
So Justice Kennedy’s dual reasoning does not, after all, avoid 
Lochnerizing. It cannot really rely on federalism, so it must rely 
entirely on equal protection—which requires Lochnerizing.  
C. Balkin’s Stratification Argument 
Another attempt to vindicate Windsor on equality grounds might 
rely on the idea that the Constitution prohibits—or even requires 
disruption of—social inequality and stigma in many forms. Thus, 
several theorists have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment 
contains an anti-caste principle;184 among them, Professor Balkin has 
perhaps the most expansive account of the kinds of social 
stratification that courts are entitled to strike down on this basis. I 
will show that his view cannot enable the Court to strike down 
DOMA (or traditional state marriage laws) without Lochnerizing, a 
point that will likely apply to other anti-caste accounts. 
First, Balkin thinks that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
class legislation—laws that “denigrate[] or demean[] a group of 
persons and [hold] them as less equal than others.”185 Are traditional-
marriage laws premised on the idea that gays and lesbians matter 
less? We can assume so only (as Balkin concedes)186 if such a 
 
184. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“But 
in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this 
country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.”); Kenneth L. 
Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the 
Constitution 3 (1989) (explaining that “the principle of equal 
citizenship” leads to “individual[s] . . . presumptively entitled to be 
treated by the organized society as . . . respected, responsible, and 
participating member[s]”). But see Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste 
Principle—Toward a Constitutional Standard for Review of Race Cases, 
30 Wayne L. Rev. 1, (1983) (discussing race discrimination), Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410, 2429 (1994) 
(limiting the anti-caste principle to race, sex, and disability).  
185.  Balkin, supra note 97, at 2348.  
186. See Jack M. Balkin, Windsor and the Constitutional Prohibition against 
Class Legislation, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013), http://balkin.blogsp
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devaluing is the only possible basis for denying same-sex partnerships 
recognition—only, that is, if the Value Judgment and General 
Welfare Defenses are unsound. But to suppose so is to Lochnerize. So 
this route to Windsor faces the same problem. Moreover, it is—
again—impossible for a legal norm to have been premised on the 
inferior dignity of a group that no one knew existed when the  
norm emerged.  
Balkin also thinks that various constitutional provisions—the 
bans on titles of nobility and bills of attainder and religious 
establishment, the Republican Government Clause, and 
Reconstruction Amendments187—give effect to a broader principle that 
opposes unjust social hierarchies. This principle is not primarily about 
classifications, or equal governmental treatment;188 nor is it “an open 
invitation” to courts “to disregard moral values we dislike.”189 Does it 
offer a path to Windsor that avoids the Lochner charge?  
First, some background on the picture that Balkin paints. Social 
groups are ever competing in a zero-sum game for social status. This 
rivalry often takes the form of moral claims against others—not, 
Balkin hastens to add, as subterfuge for bigotry, but as honest 
disputes about what forms of life are morally worthy and honorable.190 
 
ot.com/2013/06/windsor-and-constitutional-prohibition.html (“Class 
legislation is legislation that picks out a group of people for special 
benefits or special burdens without adequate public justification. The 
idea was that laws should be general, not special, and serve a public 
purpose, not simply the interests of some powerful group in 
society. . . . Of course, the judgment that a law is class legislation is 
ultimately a normative judgment. All laws classify and have some kind 
of differential impact; whether a law singles out a group for special and 
unjustified burdens or stigma is an interpretive question and a question 
of values.”).  
187. Balkin, supra note 97, at 2359 (“[T]he constitutional principle of 
opposition to unjust status hierarchies is partially vindicated by the 
Equal Protection Clause, but it is also the concern of many other 
clauses as well.”). 
188. Id. at 2358 (“I have been urging a shift from a model that focuses on 
discrimination and equal treatment to a model that focuses on the 
existence and dismantling of unjust status hierarchy. This inquiry does 
not remove normative questions. It simply asks them in different ways. 
Instead of asking whether certain classifications should be regarded as 
suspect, I am asking whether certain status hierarchies exist that are so 
unjust that the Constitution demands their disestablishment.”). 
189. Id. at 2365. 
190. Balkin explains that:  
Because status competition is tied to competing conceptions 
of morality, it is tempting to assume that moral discourse and 
moral condemnation in cultural struggles are merely a cover for 
status competition. But this view is mistaken. . . . [S]truggles 
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Thus, not only does Balkin’s argument purport not to rely on bare 
value or policy judgments—it also avoids assuming malign intent. But 
this sort of social strife does sometimes shade into judgments of 
inferior personal worth and, in extreme cases, less subtle forms of 
hostility and hatred.  
For Balkin, the Constitution does not require special protection 
for social groups as such,191 or the toppling of every status hierarchy. 
(How could it? Total egalitarianism is impossible without despotism.) 
To be constitutionally infirm, the hierarchy must be ordered around 
traits central to social identity; a distinction with widely ramifying 
effects—on “wealth, social connections, political power, employment 
prospects, the ability to have intimate relationships and form families, 
and so on.”192 And it must be an unjust consequential hierarchy—
which means, not necessarily that its basis is immutable, but that it 
rests on and hardens unjust “social meanings.”193 
Gays and lesbians, Balkin argues, are on the lower end of just 
such a hierarchy, because “they and their lifestyle are routinely 
condemned as immoral, abnormal, deviant, and against the laws of 
God and Nature”; they suffer both “social disapproval” and “de jure 
discrimination.”194 And unlike being a waiter, say, or the driver of a 
hybrid, being gay or lesbian affects most of life. Either gays and 
lesbians hide their desires, which takes a high personal toll; or they 
face the far-reaching consequences of self-disclosure: “[T]hey cannot 
have homosexual marriages, their relationships are not sanctioned by 
law, and they are subject to discrimination, harassment, and moral 
denunciation.”195  
Moreover, Balkin writes, their social subordination is unjust 
because it depends on unjust social ideals. We oppress gays and 
lesbians because they threaten another subordination, of women to 
men. It is because the gay man flouts gender stereotypes, threatening 
the masculinity and, hence, dominance of men; it is because lesbians 
flout feminine ideals and, hence, the subordination of women, that we 
deprive them socially in multiple and overlapping ways. Again, the 
same web of meanings traps women in their (inferior) place, sustains 
 
over status are struggles over what forms of life should be 
honored and receive general moral approval. 
 Id. at 2332. 
191. See id. at 2359 (“Gamblers, sluggards, gossips, opticians, and MTV 
watchers may be groups in the ordinary sense . . . . [but] they are not 
currently status groups in an ongoing status hierarchy . . . .”). 
192. Id. at 2360. 
193. Id. at 2361. 
194  Id. at 2360.  
195.  Id. 
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men in their dominance, and chokes the social lives of men or women 
whose romantic lives threaten either status by flouting gender norms. 
The dominance of heterosexuality is unjust because another form of 
social stratification—patriarchy—is “the source” of it.196 
Balkin’s account flirts with circularity. He says that status 
hierarchies are not the problem; unjust ones are. What makes the 
orientation-based hierarchy unjust is the injustice of its supporting 
social meaning. And what makes that “social meaning[]” unjust is 
that it is itself “part of an unjust status hierarchy.”197 At points 
Balkin says that unjust hierarchies are ones that “dominate and 
oppress” people, but on its face that is something that any unjust 
hierarchy does by definition.198 It cannot tell us how to identify one. 
In short, Balkin’s argument for the injustice of the orientation-
based hierarchy takes for granted the injustice of the gender-based 
one to which he says the first contributes. We will agree, of course, 
that the subjugation of women (or anyone else) is unjust; but Balkin’s 
reliance on that agreement deprives us of a general account of how, 
on his view, we can identify unjust social meaning. (And we need 
such an account because, as I have tried to show, the Value Judgment 
and General Welfare Defenses do not themselves rely on oppressive 
stereotyping.)  
He hints at an answer where he discusses what would have to be 
shown to impugn the social subordination of another group—
pedophiles—as constitutionally suspect.199  
It would not be enough, he says, to believe that pedophilia is 
morally licit. Rather, to show that the norm against pedophilia 
imposed an unjust social hierarchy, we would have to show that:  
1. That norm is “systematically connected to the oppression” of 
an identifiable social group”;  
2. The idea of children as sexually innocent is “unjustified”;  
3. Their sexual relations with adults are not “unfair 
relationships of power”;  
 
196. Id. at 2363. (emphasis added). Balkin argues that a set of social 
meanings about gender “organizes social structure, distributes dignitary 
and material benefits, and shapes and justifies people’s life chances 
through systematic privileging of things associated with being male over 
those associated with being female.” Id. at 2361. Gays “transgress this 
set of meanings.” Id. 
197.  Id. at 2361. 
198. Id. at 2366. 
199.  Id. at 2363–64. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage? 
1021 
4. Such sexual relations impose no “psychological, physical, or 
emotional harm”;  
and therefore, 
5. “[T]he reason for the taboo lies elsewhere: that it is part and 
parcel of a system that attempts to preserve a monopoly on 
sexual activity for adults alone, wrongfully oppresses children 
who stray from this prohibition, and wrongfully subjugates the 
adults who attempt to facilitate their sexual liberation, 
particularly fathers who attempt to ‘liberate’ their daughters.”200  
Now point 1 does little more than restate the conclusion: a norm 
oppresses a group if it is connected to group oppression. (This point 
adds only that the group must be “identifiable.”) The same is true of 
the second half of point 5 (“wrongfully oppresses . . . wrongfully 
subjugates”).  
What does that leave? We can tell that a taboo against an 
identifiable group unconstitutionally oppresses, on Balkin’s view, if 
(1) its moral premises are unjustified (points 2 and 3) and (2) flouting 
it causes no harm to health or welfare (point 4), thus leaving (3) no 
reasonable basis for the taboo (point 5). (Of course, a taboo is also 
unjust (and unconstitutional) if it contributes to a taboo that meets 
these criteria—as Balkin thinks the Traditional View of marriage does 
with regard to patriarchy.) 
But now Balkin’s account seems to collapse, almost entirely, into 
the ones rejected above as Lochnerizing when deployed against 
DOMA. Those other accounts deemed differential treatment or status 
unjust when there was no reasonable basis for it. Balkin adds only the 
condition that this treatment or status be “systematically connected 
to” multiple disadvantages for a single identifiable group.201 So on 
Balkin’s account, spelled out, it turns out that an unconstitutional 
caste is created wherever several policies disadvantage one group for 
no good reason.202 It follows, of course, that if any given policy has 
good reasons for differential treatment, it cannot be “systematically 
connected to” a caste in the relevant sense.  
A policy clearly stratifies in this unjust sense if it is based on the 
idea (behind Jim Crow laws, for example)203 that some people have 
less dignity than others—i.e., that there would be less moral value in 
benefitting them, than there would be in equally benefitting others.  
200. Id. at 2365. 
201.  Id. 
202. Even the requirement that the trait be central to their identity now 
looks purely derivative—a mere implication of the fact that the trait is 
the basis of many forms of discrimination. 
203. Id. at 2324. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
Windsor: Lochnerizing on Marriage? 
1022 
But we have already seen, on historical grounds, that this cannot 
possibly explain the genesis of traditional-marriage laws, which 
preceded the modern concepts of gay and lesbian identity (as Jim 
Crow could not possibly have preceded social awareness of racial 
categories).  
The only remaining basis for finding that traditional-marriage 
laws create a caste in Balkin’s sense is if their purposes, though not 
premised on anyone’s inferiority, are yet unreasonable. But this means 
that we cannot, after all, decide that traditional-marriage laws of 
themselves violate the anti-caste principle, without rejecting the 
Value Judgment and General Welfare Defenses. For if these defenses 
identify grounds for DOMA, then DOMA imposes no unjustified 
disadvantage. And if that is so, then DOMA cannot be part of a 
network of unjust burdens.  
Even if such a network exists, in that case, attacking it by 
striking down DOMA would be to use a blunt instrument. It would 
imprecisely cure the harms, while undermining DOMA’s (by 
stipulation legitimate) benefits. The same goes for judging DOMA 
unjust on the ground that it perpetuates patriarchy204—which 
depends, of course, on denying that it has any other, legitimate basis.  
D. Koppelman’s Depraved Heart Argument 
Consider, finally, Koppelman’s attempt to justify a court’s 
constitutional ruling against DOMA without impugning anyone’s 
potential value or policy judgments in favor of it, or assuming that its 
proponents are animated by a “desire to harm gay people” or even “a 
disrespectful devaluation of their interests” such as might motivate  
creating a caste system.205  
Indeed, Koppelman even sides with Justice Alito in supposing 
that these laws’ real purpose might be to promote the conjugal view 
that my coauthors and I have sketched in a book.206 And Koppelman 
 
204. Or, as Balkin puts it, that “the source” of such laws is the desire to 
maintain patriarchy. Id. at 2363 (emphasis added). 
205.  Koppelman, supra note 65, at 1052.   
206. As Koppelman himself explains:  
Alito nicely summarizes the position: “marriage is essentially the 
solemnizing of a comprehensive, exclusive, permanent union that 
is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if it does not 
always do so.” Whatever the merits of this notion, it is not 
about gay people. It is focused on the value of a certain kind of 
heterosexual union. The existence of gay people is a side issue. 
The function of marriage law, on this view, is to protect a 
human good that gay people happen to be unable to realize . . . . 
  Id. at 1052–53 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting)). Koppelman does 
distinguish such laws from DOMA, which he thinks “presents a different 
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agrees that courts generally should not impose their policy 
judgments,207 or fire their own salvos in the culture wars.208 Yet he 
finds a basis in equal protection for striking down DOMA.  
How? By expanding, or perhaps reinterpreting, the “bare desire to 
harm” test for equal protection violations. That standard would be 
“preposterously difficult to satisfy,” says Koppelman, if it required 
“that harm be the ultimate goal of the state’s action.”209 To exhibit 
harmful purpose, rather, it must be enough that the law inflicts harm 
on a group “wildly” out of proportion to the law’s benefits. Just as 
specific intent to kill is not necessary for criminal punishment—
recklessness toward life will do—so discriminatory purpose is not 
necessary for finding an equal protection violation: callousness toward 
a group should do.210  
And if the court need not show a discriminatory purpose to 
DOMA, it need not deem any alleged purpose of DOMA illicit, or to 
read behind it to some secret malign purpose—any more than a 
conviction for reckless homicide requires the lethal act to have been 
utterly pointless, or intended to kill. It will be enough to note that 
DOMA’s alleged purposes are dwarfed by its harms to gay people, as 
the reckless killer’s thrill from a joyride is dwarfed by its cost in lives. 
But this will not avoid the challenge facing every other proposal 
we have considered. Even with Koppelman’s new test for equal 
protection violations, there is no path to Windsor that avoids the 
Lochner charge. Grant that a huge gap between costs and benefits 
violates equal protection principles. The problem remains that we will 
consider DOMA’s costs high and its benefits low only if we reject the 
Value Judgment and General Welfare Defenses.  
As Koppelman sees DOMA, it imposed burdens on just about 
everyone: It required bankruptcy courts to distinguish state from 
 
case” because it “lashes out wildly at gay people”—despite the fact that 
it merely defines marriage for federal purposes as Koppelman has just 
said state laws may do. Id. at 1053 n.49.  
207. Id. at 1069 (“[John Hart] Ely’s caution about judicial policymaking is 
sensible . . . .”). 
208. Koppelman, supra note 7, at 153. 
209.  Koppelman, supra note 65, at 1068. 
210. This broader standard, moreover, fits an alternate understanding of the 
purpose of tiers of equal protection scrutiny, according to which they are 
meant to ensure that laws imposing burdens serve not just any 
legitimate interests, but ones weighty enough to justify their cost. See 
Balkin, supra note 97, at 2363–64; Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the 
Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 355, 394 (2006) (“In addition, strict scrutiny is a tool to 
determine whether there is a cost-benefit justification for governmental 
action that burdens interests for which the Constitution demands 
unusually high protection.”). 
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federal property interests in cases involving a same-sex marriage.211 By 
saddling employers with the administrative burden of separate 
administration of their employees’ federal and state family benefits, it 
even hurt our economy.212 And it burdened same-sex couples by 
denying them tax, Social Security, veterans’ and other benefits.213  
All this—Koppelman asks—for what? The choice-of-law problems 
DOMA supposedly solved were vanishingly rare. It “ease[d] 
administrative burdens” 214 for some “federal bureaucrat[]” only “once 
every few years.”215 It did not even “influence[] any state’s decision 
whether to adopt same-sex marriage”216 So even if we stipulate the 
legitimacy of these goals—including the moral goal of opposing same-
sex marriage—DOMA could not pass muster. Its benefits were slim 
compared to the costs. 
All that DOMA did effectively was to “tell [same-sex] 
couples . . . that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of 
federal recognition.”217 Its “purpose [wa]s to convey a message of 
disdain for gay couples.”218 And because none of the purported 
benefits was even nearly proportionate to its costs, DOMA 
accomplished this purpose “with extreme indifference to the human 
costs.”219 
So while Koppelman is happy to grant that state traditional-
marriage laws promote a well-meaning (if, to him, mistaken) value 
judgment, rather than devaluing gay people, he thinks DOMA only 
expressed disdain for gays.220 Why the radically different analyses of 
such laws’ purposes? He never explains.  
Let me grant, arguendo, that DOMA did little to advance the 
“downright boring” federal purposes that Justice Scalia lists in his 
Windsor dissent—uniformity, choice of law, etc.221 Still, Koppelman 
slips in describing differently the moral purposes of federal and state 
marriage laws, and this throws off the rest of his analysis. 
Koppelman describes support for traditional state marriage laws 
as “focused on the value of a certain kind of heterosexual union”—i.e.,  
211.  Koppelman, supra note 65, at 1065. 
212. Id. at 1064–65. 
213. Id. at 1065. 
214. BLAG Brief, supra note 65, at 34.  
215. Koppelman, supra note 7, at 139. 
216. Id. at 142.  
217. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).  
218.  Koppelman, supra note 7, at 151. 
219.  Id. 
220.  See id. at 141–43. 
221.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2707–08 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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on the Value Judgment Defense.222 These laws are meant “to protect a 
human good that gay people happen to be unable to realize.”223 
Koppelman does not say explicitly how they do so. But it seems clear 
that one way is by trying to shape mores, and hence practice, in 
accord with the underlying value judgment.  
Koppelman’s description of the purpose cited for DOMA, by 
contrast, refers not to promotion of the Traditional View of marriage 
but to “opposition to same-sex marriages”—i.e., to state recognition 
of same-sex bonds.224 Yet of course, it did not actually prevent that 
recognition, or even seriously hamper it. So this characterization of 
DOMA’s social goal allows Koppelman to find that DOMA did not fit 
even this alleged purpose well enough to justify its costs, even while 
he grants the legitimacy of the Traditional View. In short, Koppelman 
slips into the error of the Federalism Scholars seen above: he confuses 
intended legal and non-legal effects of DOMA. 
But there is a purpose that DOMA fit perfectly: not discouraging 
or suppressing a certain kind of state action, but socially promoting 
(insofar as it is within Congress’s power to promote), say, the Value 
Judgment Defense. After all, if the federal government is going to be 
involved in marriage at all, its involvement (like that of the states) 
will likely shape our nation’s mores.  
Indeed, Koppelman and DOMA’s other critics implicitly admit as 
much, when they decry DOMA’s great expressive power.225 So there is 
no question that DOMA promotes a certain set of value judgments. 
But if (as Koppelman grants) state marriage laws can and do convey 
the Traditional View, why not DOMA? He presents no evidence at all 
that DOMA was predicated on the idea that gay people matter less, 
as opposed to the idea (which he grants might underlie state laws) 
that the sexual relationships of men and women have a value distinct 
in kind from that of any other bond: the Value Judgment Defense.  
Moreover, what Koppelman cites as a cost of DOMA—depriving 
same-sex couples of federal marriage benefits—is judged 
disproportionate only against a baseline assumption that same- and 
opposite-sex couples are owed the same status: that is, the Revisionist 
assumption. After all, no one would say that DOMA crushingly 
disadvantages (with or without justification) people committed to 
multiple-partner bonds, or deep platonic bonds with an adult sibling, 
on the ground that it deprives poly- or platonic sibling relationships 
of federal benefits. That is because we tend to take monogamy as a 
 
222.  Koppelman, supra note 65, at 1052. 
223.  Id. at 1053. 
224.  Id. at 1066. 
225. See id. at 1069 (“DOMA’s purpose was to convey a message of disdain 
for gay couples, with extreme indifference to the human costs.”). 
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default, a norm, for recognized sexual bonds, and sexual bonds as the 
default for adult cohabitation generally. So in Koppelman’s “depraved 
heart” constitutional analysis, even the characterization of the alleged 
harm—not just of the opposing benefit—depends on substantive value 
judgments that would equate all romantic pair bonds.  
In fact, more than fifteen years ago, Koppelman considered a 
defense of DOMA’s definition of marriage much like the one I have 
mounted and concluded, on its basis, that “[a]n equal protection 
challenge to the definitional provision of DOMA, standing alone, 
would be a hard case.”226 And in a footnote in his piece on Windsor, 
he grants that it is “conceivable (though unlikely) that a court could 
decide that the goods associated with heterosexual marriage” justify 
such laws, citing in this connection my book defending this view. Yet 
Koppelman says nothing about why this route would be wrong, 
noting only that it “would be far more coherent than the claim that a 
law targeting same-sex couples is not a sex-based classification.”227 So 
he acknowledges the possibility of an argument for traditional-
marriage laws like the one I have made, says nothing directly to 
impugn it, and says much to undermine his own argument  
against DOMA.  
Conclusion 
Someone keen to save the equal-protection argument against 
DOMA (or, mutatis mutandis, against a traditional state marriage 
law) could always leave it intact and argue that Lochnerizing is 
justified. Or she could reject Lochner but specify its problem 
differently, so that Windsor is exonerated. (Some argue, for instance, 
that Lochner’s problem was not its assumption of extra-constitutional 
judgments, but its anti-constitutional rejection of redistribution.228)  
But as I have applied the Lochner charge, it is hard enough to 
satisfy, which makes it hard to excuse when satisfied.  
For I have not simply shown that Windsor’s equal protection 
argument relied on substantive moral assumptions. I have shown that 
 
226. Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage 
Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1997) (“The 
discrimination against same-sex couples may be unprecedented, a 
defender of DOMA could say, but so is the situation that called the law 
forth. If there is any positive value to the tradition of restricting 
marriage to one man and one woman, then this positive value provides a 
rational basis for DOMA. One cannot confidently infer, simply by 
considering the definitional provision on its face, that its purpose is a 
desire to harm the group. That might be the purpose, but an innocent 
explanation is available.” (footnote omitted)).  
227.  Koppelman, supra note 65, at 1053 n.52. 
228. See Amar, supra note 108, at 273–74. 
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on perfectly plausible readings of DOMA’s history, cultural and legal 
context, and structure, its purpose was not malign or demeaning; its 
means fit its alleged ends and imposed no disproportionate costs; and 
its underlying value or policy judgments could not be deemed 
unreasonable or reliant on invidious stereotypes. For all I have argued 
here, disproving any of these claims could have saved the equal-
protection argument against Windsor from the Lochner charge. Surely 
disproving some combination of these factors would save the logic of 
Brown and Loving, and of the canonical sex-discrimination cases.  
But there is no guarantee that every plausible equal-protection 
challenge to a policy would find protection against the Lochner charge 
in one of these factors. Perhaps judgments that a policy treats like 
cases unalike will always presuppose a normative view about which 
cases are ‘alike’, and some such views might be as resilient as the 
Value Judgment and General Welfare Defenses. This opens up the 
possibility that some implications of the Equal Protection Clause are 
best enforced not by the courts, with all the constitutional or 
prudential limits on their competence to apply moral and policy 
judgments, but by Congress.229 The Fourteenth Amendment does, 
after all, commit its own enforcement to our first branch. In that 
respect, at least, some shift in responsibilities would have—as key 
premises of the Windsor decision lack—a clear constitutional basis.  
 
229. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L, REV. 1212 (1978) 
(discussing the far-reaching, legal implications of when the federal 
judiciary declines to enforce fully constitutional norms out of concerns of 
institutional incompetence, separation of powers, or federalism).  
